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BEYOND PLEA BARGAINING: A THEORY 
OF CRIMINAL SETTLEMENT 
RICHARD LORREN JOLLY* 
J.J. PRESCOTT**  
Abstract: Settlement is a term rarely used in criminal law. Instead, people 
speak almost exclusively of plea bargaining—i.e., enforceable agreements in 
which a defendant promises to plead guilty in exchange for a prosecutor’s 
promise to seek leniency in charging or at sentencing. But a traditional plea 
agreement is just the most visible instance of a much broader class of possible 
criminal settlement agreements. In terms of their fundamentals, criminal set-
tlements are indistinguishable from their civil counterparts: through either an 
atomized or comprehensive bargain, parties exchange what they have for what 
they want, advancing their respective interests in cost minimization, risk miti-
gation, and value maximization. Focusing only on a defendant’s promise to 
plead guilty discounts the diversity and complexity of the agreements into 
which defendants and prosecutors may and regularly do enter. This Article ad-
vances a comprehensive framework of criminal settlement—one that leverag-
es incomplete or partial settlements as an analytical frame that stretches be-
yond mere plea bargaining. As in the civil context, criminal settlements need 
not resolve disputes outright but may instead limit or redefine a dispute in a 
way that the parties find mutually beneficial. A crucial difference in the crimi-
nal context, however, is that these bargains necessarily take place in the shad-
ow of judicial discretion that regulates access to the state’s power to punish. 
Consequently, prosecutors and defendants may agree to reshape procedures, 
issues, and potential outcomes in order to constrain or influence judicial deci-
sion-making in ways that are congruent with their respective interests. But 
judges are not passive in this landscape. They, too, may act strategically to 
prompt the bargains we ultimately observe. By modeling this interplay be-
tween parties and judges, this Article fashions a more complete picture of the 
motivations, consequences, and policy implications of criminal settlement. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The fundamental dynamics of settlement activity in the criminal do-
main are not unlike those that characterize the settlement of civil actions. 
Both contexts see parties bargaining toward mutual promises because they 
each believe they will be better off with an agreement than without one.1 
Overwhelmingly—at least ninety-seven percent of the time at the federal 
level—the criminally accused offer up some or all of their procedural rights 
because they place greater value on the consequences they expect will fol-
low from a prosecutor’s particular promises, which are usually to seek leni-
ency at sentencing or to forgo certain charges, than they do on the option to 
exercise those rights.2 Prosecutors, for their part, usually prefer the potential 
outcomes associated with a defendant’s waiver of these procedural rights—
for instance, the certainty of a conviction or savings in time and resources—
more than they do the possibility of some alternative punitive result, usually 
one emerging from the default of a full criminal trial.3 Although outcomes 
are not denominated in dollars and the risk preferences of civil and criminal 
defendants may differ in systematic ways, criminal settlement behavior, just 
like civil settlement behavior, is at root driven by the goals of cost minimi-
zation, risk mitigation, and value maximization.4 
 Despite this core similarity in the interests that stimulate and shape set-
tlement across legal domains, there is a substantial difference in the raw 
amount of autonomy that civil and criminal parties enjoy in structuring their 
bargains. Civil litigants can sculpt highly specific settlements from a near 
infinite menu of options.5 Outside of class actions and a few other scenarios 
involving conflicts of interest or substantial third-party effects, civil plain-
tiffs can voluntarily withdraw their complaint in exchange for anything (or 
                                                                                                                           
 1 For an early discussion on how rational parties will negotiate agreements to their mutual 
benefit, see generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CON-
TRACT LAW (1979). 
 2 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., TABLE D-4—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CRIMINAL FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (Mar. 31, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/d-4/
federal-judicial-caseload-statistics/2019/03/31 [https://perma.cc/9XU7-TFBL]. 
 3 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 
683 (1981) (“[T]he defendant abandons his chance of obtaining a sentence of zero, and the prose-
cutor abandons his chance of obtaining a sentence of life.”); Thomas W. Church, Jr., In Defense 
of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 518 (1979) (“Each party . . . trades the possi-
bility of total victory for the certainty of avoiding total defeat.”). 
 4 See J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 59, 71 (2016) (exploring cost minimization, risk mitigation, and value maximiza-
tion as motivating settlement in the civil context). 
 5 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 2463, 2468 (2004) (explaining that civil litigants, unlike prosecutors and defendants, can 
“adjust dollars and pennies to reflect small changes in [outcome] probability”). 
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nothing)—or, more practically speaking, anything that can be the subject 
matter of a legal contract—and do so without a judge’s permission.6 This 
means, for example, that civil litigants can construct agreements in which 
the alleged harm is incongruous with the negotiated resolution. Nothing and 
no one can stop a competent private party from accepting a peppercorn to 
resolve a wrongful death suit. The bargaining field is extremely broad and 
involves just the two in dispute—the plaintiff and the defendant. 
 Parties in a criminal dispute do not enjoy such freedom, and thus crim-
inal settlement negotiations occur in a quite different environment. A crimi-
nal conviction, which transforms a defendant into someone who is legally 
recognized as having committed a crime, requires court approval.7 Perhaps 
more importantly, the physical incarceration of a defendant—often the pri-
mary outcome of interest on both sides of the table—simply cannot be a val-
id term in a private contract, at least not one that the parties can lawfully 
perform and enforce without the involvement of a court and the satisfaction 
or waiver of certain procedural formalities before a duly sworn judge.8 More 
generally, prosecutors and defendants are unable to unilaterally implement 
any mutually preferred outcome, at least one considered “criminal,” even if 
that outcome would otherwise exactly correspond with an outcome that a 
court would enforce. A bona fide judge must review, approve, and impose 
the terms of any agreement.9 Contrast the typical criminal plea colloquy and 
subsequent sentencing before a judge in a face-to-face proceeding with the 
                                                                                                                           
 6 See Sanford I. Weisburst, Judicial Review of Settlements and Consent Decrees: An Econom-
ic Analysis, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 55 (1999). In most circumstances, there is no judicial review 
of these private decisions. 
 7 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 8 Imagine a scenario in which a citizen approaches the state and agrees to publicly announce 
criminal guilt of some sort and proceed to prison without ever involving a judicial actor—perhaps 
a Hunger Games-type situation in which someone agrees to go to prison as “tribute” for a friend 
or family member. Or imagine a civil agreement in which private parties agree that their dispute is 
best resolved by one of them spending some period of time in prison (even a private one). Such 
fanciful agreements would not be enforceable, and the parties could challenge them under a varie-
ty of federal and state constitutional provisions. In this sense, what makes a traditional plea 
agreement enforceable and distinct, at least as compared to other agreements between parties, is 
that it necessarily involves the review of someone performing a judicial role. And, as we will 
discuss below, although a party can waive certain procedures to which they are entitled, a party 
cannot waive all such procedures. The executive branch cannot criminally punish a defendant 
merely by agreement. See infra notes 83–88 and accompanying text. 
 9 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (outlining the types of agreements and procedures by which courts 
implement criminal settlements). Judges can and do reject proposed agreements for many reasons, 
including that a proposal would not give the defendant their just desserts in light of their crimes, 
that it would not deter either the individual charged or the general public in the future, and that it 
would result in an unfavorable public reaction. See Abraham S. Goldstein, Converging Criminal 
Justice System: Guilty Pleas and the Public Interest, 49 SMU L. REV. 567, 572 n.15 (1996) (col-
lecting and analyzing cases on guilty pleas). 
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typical private civil settlement in which the parties jettison the court entire-
ly, with one party agreeing to pay the other a lump sum in exchange for the 
latter abandoning their claims. 
In a similar vein, once criminal charges are filed, prosecutors and de-
fendants must operate in a legislative and constitutional milieu that dictates 
specific punitive outcomes (or ranges of outcomes) for specific harmful 
acts, and, like Hotel California, such surroundings may prove difficult to 
leave.10 The parties cannot agree to dismiss the case without judicial ap-
proval.11 Although approval is not easily withheld, the power of judicial dis-
cretion looms.12 Moreover, the crime of conviction and the punishment that 
                                                                                                                           
 10 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright & Rodney L. Engen, The Effects of Depth and Distance in a 
Criminal Code on Charging, Sentencing, and Prosecutor Power, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1935, 1940 
(2006) (reviewing how code structures affect the likelihood and content of plea bargains). 
 11 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c) (requiring judicial review of proposed settlements); id. R. 48(a) 
(requiring prosecutors to obtain “leave of court” before dismissing charges). 
 12 In Rinaldi v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he words ‘leave of court’ 
were inserted in [Federal] Rule [of Criminal Procedure] 48(a) without explanation.” 434 U.S. 22, 
29 n.15 (1977) (per curiam). Although those words “obviously vest some discretion in the court,” 
the Court recognized that “the circumstances in which that discretion may properly be exercised 
have not been delineated.” Id. The Court then explained that the requirement “is apparently meant 
to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment” but acknowledged courts have also used 
it “to deny a Government dismissal motion to which the defendant has consented if the motion is 
prompted by considerations clearly contrary to the public interest.” Id. Contra generally Thomas 
Ward Frampton, Why Do Rule 48(a) Dismissals Require “Leave of Court”?, 73 STAN. L. REV. 
ONLINE 28, 32 (2020), https://review.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2020/06/73-
Stan.-L.-Rev.-Online-Frampton.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EVH-VLLM] (arguing that the animating 
purpose of Rule 48(a) “had almost nothing to do with the rights of the accused” and contending 
that the rule was rather “understood as vesting district judges with the power to limit unwarranted 
dismissals by corruptly motivated prosecutors”). The tension here derives from the separation of 
powers between the judiciary and executive. As one judge for the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of South Carolina explained in 1860 when denying leave: “It is true that the court has no 
power to command the prosecuting officer to proceed in a criminal case if he is unwilling to do 
so. It is equally true that when the court permits an entry to be made in its minutes of the entry of 
a nolle prosequi it adopts and justifies that proceeding.” United States v. Corrie, 25 F. Cas. 658, 
669 (C.C.D.S.C. 1860) (No. 14,869); see also United States v. Krakowitz, 52 F. Supp. 774, 784 
(S.D. Ohio 1943) (denying dismissal and noting that “when the prosecuting officer . . . does not 
seek to enter a nolle prosequi solely upon his own responsibility, but by motion asks the sanction 
of the Court as his justification . . . such motion seeks the active exercise of the sound judicial 
discretion of the Court” because “more than a mere ministerial or administrative act is involved; a 
judicial determination is sought, and the Court may grant or withhold its sanction as the circum-
stances may require”). 
 In 2020, the scope of this judicial power took center stage following the Trump administra-
tion’s unopposed motion to dismiss charges brought against General Michael Flynn, where the 
United States charged him with, and he pleaded guilty to, willfully and knowingly making false 
statements to the Federal Bureau of Investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 
74, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en banc) (per curiam). District Court Judge Emmet Sullivan, expressing 
concern that an improper political directive motivated the government’s decision to drop the 
charges against Flynn, set a briefing schedule and scheduled argument on the government’s mo-
tion. Id. at 77 (discussing the briefing schedule); id. at 98 (Rao, J., dissenting) (expressing con-
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a judge must impose are often tightly linked, and the perceived severity of 
the two are almost invariably positively correlated under the law.13 The par-
ties cannot settle a case with a formal finding indicating acute criminality 
and the imposition of a negligible punishment—a murder charge cannot be 
“resolved” with the defendant paying a thousand dollar fine.14 This con-
straint on bargaining remains even if such a monetary sanction would best 
match the particular prosecutor’s and defendant’s respective risk tolerances 
and expectations regarding the outcome of the dispute.15 
 Certainly, some of these constraints are the direct consequence of legis-
lative enactments that define crimes while simultaneously listing their po-
tential punishments. Yet parties regularly waive, ignore, or define away their 
legislative rights and remedies in noncriminal contexts. And, even when the 
law strictly prohibits certain combinations of settlement terms (say, by im-
posing mandatory minimum or maximum sentences), one can imagine a 
world in which prosecutors and criminal defendants embrace bargains in-
volving “fictions” in a way that dramatically increases bargaining freedom 
even within a court setting.16 True, parties may be unable to link a formal 
                                                                                                                           
cerns about an improper political motive). Flynn appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit seeking to compel the district court to immediately grant the motion to dismiss. Id. at 
77 (majority opinion). The panel issued a writ to so compel the district court, and Judge Sullivan 
filed a petition for rehearing en banc. Id. The circuit court granted the petition and vacated the 
original panel’s ruling, remanding the case to the district court for consideration. Id. at 85. Unfor-
tunately, in the end, little progress was made on resolving this quandary because on November 20, 
2020, President Trump pardoned Flynn before the district court could rule on the issue. But in his 
memorandum opinion dismissing the case, Judge Sullivan stressed that “courts are tasked with 
making their own determinations on whether dismissal would be in the ‘public interest,’” and he 
concluded that if not for the pardon he would likely not have granted the government’s motion. 
See United States v. Flynn, C.A. No. 17-232, 2020 WL 7230702, at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 8, 2020) 
(quoting Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 29 n.15). Accordingly, it remains unclear whether judicial review in 
this context is derived from Rule 48(a), implicit in Article III authority, or both. Likewise, there is 
no clear consensus on the proper scope of the court’s discretion. See Rinaldi, 434 U.S. at 29 n.15 
(acknowledging that “the circumstances in which [Rule 48(a)] discretion may properly be exer-
cised have not yet been delineated by [the] Court”). For our purposes here, the point is simply that 
a prosecutor and a defendant cannot unilaterally agree to settle their dispute by dropping charges 
that have already been filed without judicial review—regardless of the source and extent of that 
judicial authority. The judge remains a central player in criminal settlement dynamics.  
 13 Cf. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018) (setting forth 
the correlation between severity of crime and increased punishment). 
 14 This claim is true in that a charged murder cannot be so resolved (with “murder” remaining 
the crime of conviction); it does not mean that the parties cannot modify the charge to something 
other than murder that involves the defendant paying a fine (reckless driving, for instance). For 
our discussion on such issue-modification agreements, see discussion infra Part II.B. 
 15 Prosecutors have the constitutional right to decline to prosecute altogether as part of an 
agreement, but they must operate in a more regulated space once a criminal charge of any sort 
becomes part of the arrangement. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 16 This already occurs to some degree. See discussion infra Part II.B (discussing settlements 
involving fictitious acts and even fictitious crimes). 
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first-degree murder conviction with a sentence requiring three months of 
probation. But if judges simply rubber-stamped criminal settlements—and if 
we assume that some set of facts will always exist to support all potential 
punitive outcomes—civil and criminal settlement would be virtually identi-
cal. The parties in both contexts would fine-tune their bargaining to identify 
precise substantive landing points in line with their various interests and 
without concern over third-party intervention. Any rubber-stamped legal 
label the court applied to the substantive criminal outcome might be a legal 
fiction (i.e., the defendant would be “convicted” of a purely fictional crime), 
but this would not distinguish the two domains in a significant way in this 
alternative world. After all, a civil settlement also cannot replicate a true 
jury verdict delivered by a court of law (i.e., a purely private civil settlement 
does not carry a court’s imprimatur), for example, nor any derivative effects 
of an accurate court-acknowledged outcome. 
 In the end, the fundamental distinction between the arenas of criminal 
and civil settlement revolves around the sharp difference in authority of the 
judge in the criminal domain to set the stage for the litigation, manage any 
adjudication, and influence the final outcome, particularly at sentencing. Put 
simply, judges have more power in the criminal justice system through the 
legal necessity of their sign-off for particular punitive outcomes, such as 
incarceration. The Constitution and/or legislation grant judges this authority, 
and parties cannot entirely counter it. What is more, a judge cannot lawfully 
be cut into the parties’ bargain in any significant way (i.e., the parties cannot 
directly share the surplus of any theoretical three-way bargain with a judge), 
so the parties must anticipate and contract around unresolved judicial discre-
tion. Although there is no policy consensus on the degree to which judges 
should exercise this discretion—some authors assert that too little oversight 
unfairly empowers prosecutors,17 while others warn that too much leads to 
biased sentencing variation18—the fact that judges act as gatekeepers to the 
state’s power to punish is a defining characteristic of the American criminal 
justice system.19 
 Because of this judicial custodian, a prosecutor and a defendant cannot 
unilaterally “settle” their dispute (as that term is traditionally used to mean a 
complete and private resolution). Instead, they can at best agree to limit or 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See, e.g., Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1471, 1477 (1993) (emphasizing prosecutors’ power). 
 18 See, e.g., Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Adviso-
ry Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1271 (2014). 
 19 See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bar-
gained Punishment, 58 STAN. L. REV. 293, 294 (2005) (describing judicial discretion as “an es-
sential part of any sentencing policy that simultaneously values both efficiency through negotiat-
ed dispositions and consistent application of systemwide sentencing norms”). 
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reform their dispute as it goes before a judge in some mutually beneficial 
way. In this sense, all criminal settlement agreements are best understood as 
partial or incomplete settlements.20 As an analytical frame, the concept of a 
partial settlement discards the traditional binary notion of “pure trial,” in 
which parties rely entirely on background default rules, and “pure settle-
ment,” in which they privately agree on the disposition of their dispute with 
no fact-finding procedure or decision-maker.21 Within this framework, 
agreements between parties fall along a wide spectrum of potential settle-
ments reflecting “some agreement or set of agreements . . . that will reduce 
litigation costs, minimize trial risk, or improve each party’s expected out-
come.”22 Thus, although a prosecutor and a defendant may not completely 
bypass judicial involvement in resolving their dispute, they nevertheless can 
construct and enter into partial-settlement agreements that alter it in ways 
that better accord with their respective preferences relative to the set of de-
fault rules that would otherwise govern. 
 The existing plea-bargaining literature overlooks these core settlement 
underpinnings and their implications for criminal law and procedure. Schol-
ars have largely written themselves into a corner by addressing only a small 
subset of feasible bargains, specifically those that involve defendants agree-
ing to plead guilty to one or more criminal charges, generally in exchange 
for prosecutorial concessions with respect to charges or the consequences of 
convictions.23 Generally speaking, charge bargaining refers to a prosecutor 
agreeing to drop certain charges in return for a defendant’s waiver of certain 
procedural rights—principally, the right to a trial.24 Sentence bargaining in-
volves a defendant agreeing to relinquish procedural rights in return for a 
prosecutor’s promise to seek a punishment discount at sentencing.25 Much of 
the plea bargaining scholarship builds on this typology either by adding 
complications, such as the interests of relevant third parties,26 or by stressing 
                                                                                                                           
 20 J.J. Prescott and Kathryn E. Spier describe and develop in detail the idea of incomplete or 
partial settlements in the civil context. See Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 71. 
 21 Id. at 62. 
 22 Id. 
 23 See, e.g., Kyle Graham, Crimes, Widgets, and Plea Bargaining: An Analysis of Charge 
Content, Pleas, and Trials, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1595 n.112 (2012) (“There exist two basic 
types of plea bargains: charge bargains and sentence bargains.”). 
 24 See, e.g., William W. Wilkins, Jr., Plea Negotiations, Acceptance of Responsibility, Role of 
the Offender, and Departures: Policy Decisions in the Promulgation of Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 181, 185–86 (1988) (comparing charge and sentence bar-
gaining). 
 25 Id. at 186. 
 26 See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1981 
(1992) (reviewing the externalities and agency problems that can prevent plea bargains from be-
ing mutually beneficial). 
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that these types of bargains routinely fail to return expected or socially de-
sirable results.27 Recent commentators have further supplemented the mix 
with the concept of fact bargaining—in which the parties stipulate to a ver-
sion of facts that is consistent with the charges to be filed with the court—
but even this advance has been presented with the defendant’s guilty plea as 
a fixed starting assumption.28 
 In our view, by maintaining this plea-focused approach to bargaining in 
the criminal law, scholars have analyzed just one (admittedly important) 
side of the Rubik’s Cube. They have overlooked other forms of criminal set-
tlement, both actual and theoretical. Consequently, they have missed the fact 
that the diverse terms of these multifarious arrangements can serve as sub-
stitutes and complements during bargaining. Parties can assemble these 
terms into settlement agreements that together mitigate the costs and risks of 
trial and improve ex ante expected outcomes, at times in ways that improve 
on traditional plea bargaining. More problematically, the traditional frame-
work has led many scholars to disregard the critical role that judicial discre-
tion—and the resulting uncertainty parties experience—plays in shaping 
criminal settlement agreements.29 The fixation on guilty pleas may have 
prevented the development of a more comprehensive theory of criminal set-
tlement that accounts for the variety of agreements into which parties may, 
and regularly do, enter. True, some thinkers have recently begun to push a 
broader understanding of plea bargaining that stretches beyond its tradition-
al conceptual boundaries.30 But none has yet offered a comprehensive tax-
                                                                                                                           
 27 See, e.g., Russel D. Covey, Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 91 (2009). 
 28 Thea B. Johnson, for instance, describes what she calls “fictional plea[s]” as “a plea bar-
gain agreement in which the defendant pleads guilty to a crime he did not commit, with the con-
sent and knowledge of multiple actors in the criminal justice system.” Thea Johnson, Fictional 
Pleas, 94 IND. L.J. 855, 857 (2019) (emphasis added). And, in condemning fact bargaining, Judge 
William G. Young portrays “it [as] involv[ing] a fraud on the court as the government’s recital of 
material facts during the plea colloquy and at sentencing necessarily must omit or at minimum 
gloss over facts material to sentencing.” Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 62 (D. 
Mass. 2001). Although it is true that fact bargaining regularly occurs at sentencing “because cer-
tain material ‘facts,’ . . . now mathematically drive every sentencing decision,” as we will discuss 
below, there is no reason that the benefits of such bargaining cannot be realized by the parties 
without the defendant pleading guilty. See id. 
 29 See, e.g., Daniel S. McConkie, Judges as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 61, 66 (2015) (“Judges ensure that the plea is ‘knowing’ and ‘voluntary’ but essen-
tially rubberstamp most plea agreements . . . .”). 
 30 For a discussion of this burgeoning scholarship, see Talia Fisher, The Boundaries of Plea 
Bargaining: Negotiating the Standard of Proof, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 945 (2007) 
(exploring the border between alienable and inalienable procedural rights); Gregory M. Gilchrist, 
Trial Bargaining, 101 IOWA L. REV. 609, 614 (2016) (arguing in support of allowing defendants 
and prosecutors to bargain over streamlined trial procedures); Russell M. Gold et al., Civilizing 
Criminal Settlements, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1607, 1610 (2017) (using the term “settlement” to describe 
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onomy of the criminal settlement agreements that are likely to surface in the 
shadow of pervasive judicial discretion or a unifying theory that accounts 
for the motivations of parties in reaching such settlements. Criminal settle-
ment as an idea and as an art is therefore ripe for academic reassessment, 
theoretical development, and practical innovation. 
 This Article looks beyond plea bargaining and offers a framework for 
conceptualizing all criminal settlements—or, agreements between prosecu-
tors and defendants that alter the default rules of criminal adjudication. We 
focus our discussion mostly on bargaining in federal courts for the sake of 
exposition, but our arguments and descriptions hold for criminal settlement 
agreements generally. In essence, we claim that prosecutors and defendants 
“settle” by entering into agreements that reformulate their dispute to maxim-
ize their respective interests. These interests can be roughly characterized as 
cost minimization, risk mitigation, and ex ante value maximization. Parties 
realize these interests by crafting agreements that can be sorted into three 
non-exclusive categories: procedure-modification, issue-modification, and 
outcome-modification agreements.31 But because judges necessarily sit as 
                                                                                                                           
plea agreements and contending that criminal proceedings should incorporate certain procedures 
from the civil context to help make agreements more informed and voluntary); Nancy Jean King, 
Priceless Process: Nonnegotiable Features of Criminal Litigation, 47 UCLA L. REV. 113, 118 
(1999) (noting that “[s]hort of foregoing trial altogether, defendants can make trials more eco-
nomical or less risky for prosecutors . . . by waiving particular rules”); John Rappaport, Unbun-
dling Criminal Trial Rights, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 181, 182 (2015) (striving “to dispel the illusion 
that plea bargaining occurs within an all-or-nothing framework” and imagining the effects of 
making all procedural rights negotiable). Additionally, some scholars have referred to non-
prosecution agreements (NPAs) and deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) as forms of “crimi-
nal settlement.” See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, The Evolution of Corporate 
Criminal Settlements: An Empirical Perspective on Non-prosecution, Deferred Prosecution, and 
Plea Agreements, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 537, 544 (2015). These types of agreements do indeed 
look much like what could be considered “settlement” in the traditional sense. They usually in-
volve a corporate defendant providing an admission of fact, a commitment to cooperate, a speci-
fied duration for the arrangement, and an agreement to monetary and non-monetary sanctions. Id. 
As such, both NPAs and DPAs are examples of bundles of settlement terms, which complement 
one another in ways that advance the parties’ interests. Id. Like other criminal settlements, judges 
must review DPA filings to ensure that there is no undue exercise of discretion by prosecutors and 
that there is compliance with laws. Id. at 547–48. NPAs are distinct, however, in that they do not 
require the filing of criminal charges with the court so there is no judicial review. Id. at 545. 
NPAs are thus akin to civil litigants agreeing not to involve the court at all and to resolve their 
dispute privately. Although NPAs and DPAs are of great interest, this Article focuses instead on 
criminal settlements involving individuals to illustrate the broad applicability of our criminal 
settlement framework. Importantly, the model we advance here applies with equal force to crimi-
nal charges brought against corporate entities and can be used in that domain to illustrate the par-
ties’ various interests in entering into such agreements. 
 31 This typology of criminal settlement agreements aligns with the basic arrangement seen in 
civil litigation, but the mechanisms by which the agreements operate are distinct in the two con-
texts. See Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 80 (advancing a theory of partial-settlement agree-
ments in civil litigation). 
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final arbiters in criminal cases, parties must fashion arrangements that ac-
count for ample judicial discretion and uncertainty—such as by constraining 
judicial discretion to channel possible punitive outcomes in ways that con-
form with parties’ expectations and preferences.32 
 Our analysis has real-world payoffs. Concrete examples of criminal 
settlements that align with our framework abound—and extend far beyond 
traditional plea bargains. For example, defendants and prosecutors may 
agree to modify the procedure for determining guilt, trading a constitutional-
ly guaranteed jury trial for a bench trial, with each party potentially believ-
ing that relying on a legally trained and experienced decision-maker will 
produce a better or more expeditious resolution.33 Or they may agree to 
modify the substantive issues at play in the dispute, regardless of the proce-
dural scheme employed (such as the defendant stipulating to a specific 
quantity of drugs34), which will in turn limit the issues that the factfinder 
needs to address as well as the range and types of outcomes available to the 
judge.35 Parties may also agree to modify the available punishment options 
by presenting a mutually agreed-upon sentence as a nonbinding recommen-
dation to the judge rather than as a binding requirement of the plea.36 This 
approach has the effect of amplifying uncertainty because the judge may 
ignore the parties’ recommendation. But a mutually optimistic prosecutor 
and defendant may wager on this uncertainty, with each expecting the judge 
to deviate in their favor.37 Remarkably, parties may even bargain over terms 
such as the level of enthusiasm the prosecutor will use in making a sentenc-
ing proposal to the judge.38 Indeed, the scope of the settlement terms in any 
                                                                                                                           
 32 Milton Heumann was perhaps the first to describe plea bargains essentially as agreements 
over how the parties will present the case to the judge. See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAIN-
ING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 43 (1978) (“The 
agreement that emerges from the sentence bargain can take several forms, all of which relate to 
what will, or will not, be said to the judge on sentencing day.”). 
 33 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2500. 
 34 See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 571 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and 
concurring in judgment) (“The upshot is that in many such cases defendant and prosecutor will 
enter into a stipulation before trial as to drug amounts to be used at sentencing (if the jury finds 
the defendant guilty.)”), overruled on other grounds by Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 
(2013). 
 35 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, To Tell the Truth: The Problem of Prosecutorial “Manip-
ulation” of Sentencing Facts, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 324, 325 (1996) (exploring parties’ motivations 
in entering into these types of issue-modification agreements). 
 36 See Shayna M. Sigman, Note, An Analysis of Rule 11 Plea Bargain Options, 66 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1317, 1324 (1999). 
 37 Id. at 1324–26. 
 38 See, e.g., United States v. Benchimol, 471 U.S. 453, 455 (1985) (per curiam) (upholding an 
agreement in which a prosecutor did not make his recommendation “enthusiastically,” at least in 
part because he had not promised to do so); United States v. Riggs, 347 F.3d 17, 19 (1st Cir. 
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case is potentially—and often in reality—vast. And, just as in the civil set-
tlement context, criminal settlement agreements may combine procedure-, 
issue-, and outcome-modification terms as substitutes and complements to 
allow parties to tailor their dispute even more profitably. 
 Our partial settlement framework also allows us to advance a better 
understanding of the push-pull relationship between the judge, on one side, 
and the prosecutor and the defendant, on the other. By partially settling in 
some form, the prosecutor and the defendant manipulate the fundamentals of 
their dispute—including the range and forms of punishment available to the 
judge—allowing parties to speculate over potential outcomes in line with 
their respective risk tolerances. The indeterminacy introduced by judicial 
discretion can operate through party information asymmetries, overopti-
mism, loss aversion, and so on to encourage such bargains, activating risk-
seeking or risk-averse behavior on behalf of both prosecutors and defend-
ants.39 But judges are not passive players in this game; rather, they have the 
implicit power (and can take steps to enhance that power) to shape the types 
of agreements into which the parties will enter. Judges can play their role by 
strategically signaling what they are willing to accept and/or the potential 
price of their going along, both by injecting themselves into the litigation 
and by purposely building a reputation through their decisions in other cas-
es. Even more so than in civil litigation, anticipated judicial behavior is ev-
er-present in criminal settlement dynamics. 
 The Article concludes by briefly identifying a few implications of our 
analysis. By conceptually rooting criminal settlement agreements in the par-
tial settlement frame, new solutions to old problems in research and policy 
debates may emerge. In thinking about how best to balance power between 
judges, prosecutors, and defendants, we must understand how and why par-
ties structure their settlement agreements—including traditional plea bar-
gains—the way they do. We are unable to address in this Article the legiti-
mate concerns over the moral and political complexities that criminal set-
tlements of all types entail.40 Proper treatment of those issues is necessary, 
                                                                                                                           
2003) (per curiam) (holding that a prosecutor’s bargained-for joining of the defense’s recommen-
dation need not be enthusiastic, if enthusiasm was not part of the bargain). 
 39 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2533 (noting that “indeterminate sentencing plays on overopti-
mism and loss aversion to encourage bargains”). 
 40 The literature on these issues is immense and far-reaching. See, e.g., ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 85 (2001) (“Plea bargaining . . . trans-
forms the act of confession from a ritual of moral and social healing into a cynical game, reinforc-
ing the criminal’s alienated view of society.”); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 
46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 12 (1978) (“In twentieth-century America we have duplicated the central 
experience of medieval European criminal procedure: we have moved from an adjudicatory to a 
concessionary system.”). 
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but first things first. By understanding the dynamics of the criminal settle-
ment process, both holistically and piece by piece, we take the constructive 
first step of disentangling and modeling what has become the central prac-
tice of the American criminal justice system. 
I. THE INTERESTS AND CONSTRAINTS OF CRIMINAL SETTLEMENT 
 Criminal settlement is akin to civil settlement in its essential determi-
nants and dynamics. This should not be surprising. In both contexts, parties 
bargain whenever possible toward a mutually beneficial agreement that 
modifies any of the less desirable default arrangements set by law.41 Mutual 
benefit does not mean that any negotiated outcome is objectively good, fair, 
or equal. Settlement will at times result in the innocent or faultless being 
imprisoned or paying to resolve accusations against them.42 Instead, we use 
“mutual benefit” to refer to the net improvement both parties may perceive 
in striking a particular bargain in relation to their subjective valuation of 
their alternative options. In other words, parties ask: “Will this agreement 
make me better off than all other current—and potentially terrible—options 
available to me, including the possibility of not entering into any agreement 
at all and relying on default rules?” In effect, parties assess potential agree-
ments relative to the position in which they believe they would be absent 
some form of settlement.43 In this way, “[e]ach party . . . trades the possibil-
ity of total victory for the certainty of avoiding total defeat.”44 Criminal set-
tlements, just like civil settlements, “are simply agreements between parties 
to a dispute that offer value to both on one or more of the following dimen-
sions: reducing adjudication costs, mitigating losses due to risk, and maxim-
izing ex ante expected returns.”45 
 But relative to the broad freedom to contract that characterizes civil 
settlement, the ambit of viable criminal settlements is more limited. As we 
                                                                                                                           
 41 “Plea bargaining flows from ‘the mutuality of advantage’ to defendants and prosecutors, 
each with his own reasons for wanting to avoid trial.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 
(1978) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)). 
 42 The “innocence problem” in the criminal context and the “nuisance lawsuit” in the civil 
context are both well-documented in the American justice system. See, e.g., Covey, supra note 
27, at 73; Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: 
Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849, 1850 (2004). 
 43 This expected utility model dominates the literature on settlement. See, e.g., Robert J. 
Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement and Litiga-
tion Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 632 (2006) (“[S]ettlement is a function of transac-
tion cost economics.”). 
 44 Church, supra note 3, at 518; see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 683 (“[T]he defendant 
abandons his chance of obtaining a sentence of zero, and the prosecutor abandons his chance of 
obtaining a sentence of life.”). 
 45 Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 78 (discussing civil settlement). 
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note above, civil litigants, outside of a few select circumstances involving 
class actions or substantial third-party effects, are free to enter into an al-
most infinite variety of settlement agreements with or without court say-
so.46 Not so for criminal litigants. The legislature, the Constitution, or both 
empower a third party, the judge, with the ability to derail many plausible 
bargains—for example, by enforcing statutory minimum and maximum sen-
tences when the parties would prefer another outcome47—and to change the 
relative attractiveness of others—for instance, by exercising the “last move” 
in sentencing, which introduces significant uncertainty in any bargain in-
volving outcomes. Judges as scene-stealers often limit the bargaining space 
but also potentially expand it when they are willing to play roles that would 
be difficult to reproduce privately at low cost in the civil context. Neverthe-
less, although party autonomy is an essential distinguishing factor between 
criminal and civil settlement, the underlying interests that motivate bargain-
ing in both contexts remain in tune. 
A. The Parties’ Interests in Criminal Settlement 
 Criminal settlement is the product of optimizing agents engaged in util-
ity-maximizing “trade.” Each party possesses “assets” that the other may 
value, so they bargain with the goal of achieving mutual gains. In the most 
familiar scenario, prosecutors “buy” concessions from defendants by prom-
ising some benefit (e.g., a lesser charge or a shorter sentencing recommen-
dation), and in turn defendants “sell” some or all of their procedural rights.48 
A defendant’s procedural bargaining chips are many, with the most valuable 
often being the right to a trial, the right to withhold information, and the 
right to appellate review.49 The price that a prosecutor is willing to pay, and 
that a defendant is willing to accept, for waiving such rights is a function of 
the expected effects of the new terms on the costs, the risks, and the ex-
pected outcomes in the alternative—i.e., proceeding to trial without some 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Weisburst, supra note 6, at 55. 
 47 For a list of federal mandatory sentences, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 
RL32040, FEDERAL MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES 101–16 (2013), https://fas. 
org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32040.pdf [https://perma.cc/DN6U-48MQ]. Judges must exercise discretion 
in interpreting and applying regulations, such as the federal Sentencing Guidelines, to issue rea-
sonable punishments. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005). 
 48 The Supreme Court has embraced this model: “A defendant can ‘maximize’ what he has to 
‘sell’ only if he is permitted to offer what the prosecutor is most interested in buying.” United 
States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (5th ed. 1998) (“[R]esources tend to gravitate toward their most valuable 
uses if voluntary exchange . . . is permitted.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Plea Bargaining and Price Theory, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
920, 924, 940 n.119 (2016). 
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agreement.50 If the proposed terms reduce litigation costs and risk-bearing 
losses and/or improve the anticipated outcome for either party, the prosecu-
tor and the defendant are more likely to settle, at least if they can share the 
gains in trade.51 We should expect to observe in practice all agreements that 
can improve on the status quo with respect to these considerations, absent 
some legal limitation or other friction, such as negotiation costs. 
 Consider first the real burden of adjudicating criminal charges through 
a full-blown jury trial in a traditional courtroom with all of the innumerable 
constitutional and statutory protections to which a criminal defendant is le-
gally entitled—what Justice Scalia once called “the exorbitant gold standard 
of American justice.”52 For the state, administering the criminal justice sys-
tem is resource intensive. The costs of investigating and prosecuting crimes, 
securing defendants’ rights, maintaining often overcrowded courts and jails, 
and ultimately enforcing sentences all fall solely on the state.53 The govern-
ment cannot (easily) abandon an accused’s sundry rights without their con-
sent. Accordingly, the state has incentives to control systemic costs through 
piecemeal bargaining, lowering marginal costs one case at a time.54 As Chief 
Justice Burger observed, “If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-
scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by 
many times the number of judges and court facilities.”55 
 The finite nature of criminal justice resources ultimately constrains the 
prosecutor’s bargaining position. Research demonstrates a strong positive 
correlation between judicial caseloads and the rate of guilty pleas; that is, as 
the supply of criminal justice resources decreases, the prosecutorial demand 
for resource-efficient settlement increases.56 Relatedly, data show that pros-
                                                                                                                           
 50 See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 26, at 1980 (noting that “the expected costs of trial, the 
likelihood of success, and the expected trial sentence” determines a case’s value). 
 51 We are imagining an ex ante Pareto improvement. If an arrangement will only improve the 
situation for a single party (and make it no worse for the other party), the benefiting party may be 
able to induce agreement by sharing the gains by offering something—anything—to the other 
party, although fairness concerns may force a more equitable split in practice. 
 52 Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 186 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 53 See, e.g., STEPHANOS BIBAS, THE MACHINERY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 83–88 (2012) (dis-
cussing “[t]he state’s criminal-justice monopoly”). 
 54 Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 205, 233 
(“[P]rosecutors turn time-consuming and resource-expensive investigations and trials into time-
efficient pleas, and in so doing, they can keep the numbers of cases closed and the numbers of 
new cases that come in at a manageable equilibrium.”). 
 55 Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971). 
 56 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion II: An Empirical Analy-
sis of Declining Federal Drug Sentences Including Data from the District Level, 87 IOWA L. REV. 
477, 538 (2002) (noting the trend between guilty plea rates and judge caseloads); Covey, supra 
note 49, at 934 (graphing the relationship between the guilty plea rate and judicial caseloads from 
1946 to 2003); Welsh S. White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. 
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ecutors who bring cases in federal districts with higher rates of judicial va-
cancies are more likely to negotiate toward guilty pleas (as well as offer 
more favorable discounts at sentencing) than their counterparts in jurisdic-
tions with relatively fewer judicial vacancies. The study documenting this 
pattern quotes one prosecutor as reporting that the “resource in shortest sup-
ply [is] the number of district judges.”57 In the criminal justice marketplace, 
the supply and demand of “system” resources necessarily influence the go-
ing rate for settling criminal cases. Prosecutors are more willing to offer de-
fendants deep sentencing discounts when case congestion causes the costs of 
not settling to be especially high for the state—and, particularly and more 
realistically, for their own offices’ budgets. 
 Beyond the need to operate within and relieve stress on the state’s ad-
judicative resources, prosecutors acting in a professional capacity also bear 
significant case-level costs during litigation, particularly when they find it 
necessary to proceed to trial sans agreement. These are not personal finan-
cial costs like those civil plaintiffs must often bear, but rather the opportuni-
ty costs that necessarily accompany a fixed agency budget.58 The govern-
ment budgets that support prosecutorial activities are not insignificant, but 
prosecutors can nevertheless bring only so many cases and often struggle to 
manage their caseloads.59 Prosecutors are therefore wont to dispose of their 
cases in ways that will maximally leverage their resources, which may mean 
settling cases involving lower levels of criminality quickly, allowing them to 
turn their attention to higher profile defendants. But whatever the precise 
tradeoff, prosecutors likely seek “the maximum deterrent punch [(or punch 
of some sort)] out of whatever resources are committed to crime control.”60 
                                                                                                                           
PA. L. REV. 439, 448 (1971) (comparing Philadelphia and New York City and noting that “be-
cause more guilty pleas must be entered in New York [due to limited resources], the concessions 
offered to defendants are concomitantly increased”). 
 57 See Crystal S. Yang, Resource Constraints and the Criminal Justice System: Evidence from 
Judicial Vacancies, 8 AM. ECON. J. 289, 295 (2016) (quoting William Braniff, Local Discretion, 
Prosecutorial Choices and the Sentencing Guidelines, 5 FED. SENT’G REP. 309, 312 (1993)) 
(“[J]udicial vacancies require prosecutors to allocate limited resources among potential cases, 
such that the number of active judges in a district court is effectively a bottleneck on prosecu-
tion.”). 
 58 As the Justice Manual acknowledges: “Federal law enforcement resources are not sufficient 
to permit prosecution of every alleged offense over which federal jurisdiction exists.” U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.230 cmt. 1 (2018), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-
principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.230 [https://perma.cc/NXB6-GVV5].  
 59 See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay 
on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 601 (2005) (“Ex-
treme docket pressure characterizes DAs’ offices . . . .”). 
 60 Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 
290 (1983); see also Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. 
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In practical terms, economizing on the time and money devoted to one case 
frees up resources for other cases; closing cases quickly and inexpensively 
is valuable to prosecutors because they can do more with less.61 
 Prosecutors also have preferences that go beyond the traditional pur-
poses of punishment—most notably, they often pursue opportunities to ad-
vance their career. Personal aspirations can affect how prosecutors evaluate 
individual settlement terms.62 For this reason, prosecutors may value a con-
viction itself—i.e., a “win”—more than they do any particular sentence.63 At 
the same time, prosecutors and defendants are not always playing a zero-
sum game like civil litigants. Scenarios exist in which both parties will pre-
fer lighter sentences, given their respective preferences. “[E]xtra months in 
prison are not like marginal dollars in civil cases,” William Stuntz recog-
nized; “[o]nce the defendant’s sentence has reached the level the prosecutor 
prefers . . . adding more time offers no benefit to the prosecutor.”64 Whether 
this dynamic actually privileges more reliable convictions or instead longer 
average sentences, prosecutors nonetheless have views (either personal or 
informed by the macro policies of their respective offices) on the relative 
                                                                                                                           
L. REV. 50, 107 (1968) (explaining that prosecutors will seek outsized criminal punishments in 
high-publicity cases to better accomplish their goals). 
 61 Importantly, not all of a state’s criminal justice resource constraints operate on prosecutors. 
Funding and duties are divided between state actors (e.g., police, corrections), and prosecutors 
typically do not “pay” for many of the consequences of their decisions. See Daniel Richman, 
Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 774–76 
(2003). This failure of prosecutors to internalize the full costs of their bargaining results has been 
termed a “correctional free lunch.” See FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SCALE 
OF IMPRISONMENT 140 (1991); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the 
Mass Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47, 50–51 (2008) (arguing that line prosecutors 
should regularly receive information on the prison population so that they might consider it in 
negotiating plea bargains). That said, there may be reputational costs to prosecutors who burden 
judges and other actors with trying unreasonable cases or proposing settlements that externalize 
costs to other agencies to an excessive degree. See Yang, supra note 57, at 294. 
 62 Of course, as individuals, prosecutors can be motivated by a host of unique and overlap-
ping considerations. See Richman, supra note 61, at 758 (“Convictions? Sentence-years? Deter-
rence? Agency prestige? Lifetime earnings? Leisure?”). 
 63 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 1010 (2009) (noting “careerism” as pervasive among prosecutors); Rich-
ard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 379, 381–82 (2005) (noting the impact of prosecutors’ career ambitions); 
Andrew Manuel Crespo, The Hidden Law of Plea Bargaining, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1303, 1311–
12 (2018) (arguing that prosecutors rarely want to maximize sentences and instead seek “pre-
ferred sentence[s], in the most efficient way possible”); Carrie Leonetti, When the Emperor Has 
No Clothes III: Personnel Policies and Conflicts of Interest in Prosecutors’ Offices, 22 CORNELL 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 53, 63 (2012) (describing how prosecutor offices’ internal evaluation and re-
ward structures focus on conviction rates). 
 64 William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. 
L. REV. 2548, 2554 (2004). 
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merits of certain settlement terms, and this affects bargaining preferences 
and behavior.65 So, be it a simple agreement to plead guilty to the crime al-
leged or some more complex arrangement, achieving a settlement helps 
prosecutors realize their various interests. 
 Like prosecutors, criminal defendants also aim to minimize the adjudi-
cation costs associated with their defense. Such costs are readily evident for 
defendants who retain private counsel,66 but even indigent defendants suffer 
financially—they are charged for being prosecuted. Since the 1990s, at least 
forty-three states and the District of Columbia have enacted laws requiring 
defendants to repay a portion of the costs associated with their public de-
fense, with some charging a flat fee and others requiring repayment of all 
accrued costs.67 Likewise, certain states assess fees associated with the exer-
cise of other constitutional rights, such as compelling a witness’s testimo-
ny,68 or simply empaneling a jury for trial.69 But more important than any 
direct fee (which realistically may never be collected) are the psychological 
costs and delay associated with demanding a trial on the merits—which may 
not occur until after the defendant has spent months or even years in jail. 
Appearing for arraignment as well as preparing and being present at all pro-
ceedings also impose opportunity and reputational costs on defendants and 
their families. For many, simply enjoying their due process rights can gener-
ate costs far in excess of the punitive burdens that are likely to result from 
conviction.70 Indeed, for some defendants “the process is the punishment.”71 
All criminal defendants have an interest in reducing adjudication costs, 
broadly construed, and therefore pursue feasible agreements that deliver 
more bang for the proverbial buck. 
 In addition to seeking compromises to limit costs, criminal defendants 
also aim to minimize the expected sanctions associated with any conviction. 
                                                                                                                           
 65 See Richman, supra note 61, at 756 (explaining, in the federal context, the influence of a 
given administration’s criminal justice agenda). 
 66 See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 595, 
599 (1993) (noting that most private criminal defense agreements involve “either entirely prepaid 
fixed fees . . . or the payment up front of a substantial retainer”). 
 67 States vary greatly in how they assess these costs and the extent to which they factor in a 
defendant’s ability to pay. See John D. King, Privatizing Criminal Procedure, 107 GEO. L.J. 561, 
571–72 (2019) (reviewing criminal justice “user fees”). 
 68 Virginia, for instance, charges a $50 fee for a witness’s appearance at a hearing or trial if 
the defendant is found guilty of the charges for which the witness is summoned. Id. at 578 (citing 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-187.1(F) (West 2017)). 
 69 Arkansas, for example, charges a nonrefundable $150 jury fee. Id. at 580 (citing ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 21-6-403(b)(1) (West 2013)). 
 70 See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 5 (Russell Sage 1992). 
 71 Id. at 294. 
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All else equal, defendants prefer to spend less rather than more time behind 
bars.72 At the extreme, defendants may seek settlement to avoid the risk of 
capital punishment.73 But there are many other forms of punishment beyond 
the deprivation of life or liberty, including monetary fines, property forfei-
ture, and mandatory restitution. Collateral consequences under the law, such 
as sex offender registration and notification requirements, deportation, and 
the loss of the right to bear arms, to name just a few, also flow from many 
convictions.74 Some defendants may view these collateral effects as more 
severe than any formal court-ordered fine or incarceration.75 Criminal con-
victions can also produce losses associated with having a criminal record, 
including fewer employment and housing opportunities.76 So while defend-
ants bargain in the hopes of mitigating litigation costs, they also seek to im-
prove the likely outcome of their dispute (conditional on there being a dis-
pute) and stand willing to bargain with the currency of the marketplace—
their statutory and constitutional rights—to improve their position. 
 Both prosecutors and defendants assess costs (e.g., time, money, and 
anxiety) and outcomes (e.g., convictions, sentences, and any collateral con-
sequences) under conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric information. 
Neither party can be certain that a conviction or an acquittal will occur at 
                                                                                                                           
 72 This does not mean that some defendants are not willing to spend more time imprisoned to 
avoid other costs. Preferences across punishment types can vary among rational actors. See gen-
erally DERYCK BEYLEVELD, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF GENERAL DETERRENTS AGAINST CRIME: 
AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EVALUATIVE RESEARCH (1978). 
 73 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 747 (1970) (upholding the constitutionality of 
plea bargaining in the context of capital punishment). 
 74 See, e.g., Wayne A. Logan, Informal Collateral Consequences, 88 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 
1103 (2013) (outlining “non-penal sanctions attaching to convictions”); see also Charlie Gerstein 
& J.J. Prescott, Process Costs and Police Discretion, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 268, 271–72 (2015), 
https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/vol128_GersteinPrescott.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/X2QB-APJR] (arguing that, for certain crimes, these process costs render substantive 
criminal law irrelevant). 
 75 So weighty are such consequences that the Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional 
right to be informed of them—or at least some of them—in advance of a guilty plea. See, e.g., 
Brian M. Murray, Beyond the Right to Counsel: Increasing Notice of Collateral Consequences, 49 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1139, 1161 (2015). 
 76 For this reason, the potential for expungement of a conviction might be of great value to a 
defendant. Although there is no general federal expungement statute, state courts with such stat-
utes have recognized expungement as a legitimate bargaining chip. See, e.g., People v. Acuna, 92 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 224, 228 (Ct. App. 2000) (rejecting an appellant’s request for expungement, noting 
that there was “no express provision in his plea bargain that mentions expungement,” nor was 
expungement “clearly part of the parties’ understanding”); Commonwealth v. Lutz, 788 A.2d 993, 
1001 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (“In the absence of an agreement as to expungement, Appellant stands 
to receive more than he bargained for in the plea agreement if the dismissed charges are later 
expunged.”); see also J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal Convictions: An 
Empirical Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2470 (2020) (showing the logistical and legal difficul-
ties eligible individuals face in obtaining expungement). 
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the outset of a prosecution or even midway through a trial. Nor can parties 
be certain about what will flow from any verdict, nor what costs will accrete 
unexpectedly en route to a case’s final disposition. As individuals, defend-
ants and prosecutors are sensitive to risk, although some defendants may be 
risk-loving and some prosecutors may approach risk neutrally. By and large, 
however, parties work to mitigate their risks in line with their preferences to 
maximize their overall utility. A prosecutor may have an interest in main-
taining a high conviction rate and, for that reason, will be motivated to min-
imize any risk of acquittal by offering terms that reduce a defendant’s ex-
pected sanction by enough to induce mutual agreement.77 Likewise, a de-
fendant may wish to minimize the risk of an outsized punishment and will 
often offer to trade away the chance of a complete acquittal.78 Parties suffer 
risk-bearing costs in relation to the perceived strength or weakness of the 
evidence and the likelihood of a particular outcome. 
 In sum, the “inputs” to criminal settlement behavior are the likely liti-
gation costs (both psychological and financial), the expected outcomes post-
litigation, and the uncertainty associated with any set of terms (including an 
absence of terms in the case of a failure to settle), all channeled through par-
ties’ respective preferences—just as in civil litigation. Parties optimize over 
potential settlement packages by taking into account how much they indi-
vidually value the costs and expected outcomes as well as how much they 
dislike the riskiness of a particular path.79 If there is a set of terms by which 
the parties can mutually benefit relative to the default arrangement—a “na-
ked” trial—one party will begin by making an offer, assuming negotiation 
costs are not too high. It might be that no agreement can improve the situa-
tion for both parties, in which case settlement negotiations will fail. If there 
is only one set of terms that offers mutual improvement for the parties, the 
only questions are whether they will be able to “find” those terms, given the 
real-world challenges of bargaining and trade, and whether the preferred 
arrangement of terms is legally permissible. 
 Finally, if there are many permutations of mutually beneficial and le-
gally permissible terms that the parties could assemble from among the var-
ious procedural adjustments, issue alterations, and outcome modifications 
on the table, the parties must simply negotiate over which combination to 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See Easterbrook, supra note 60, at 289 (explaining this effect). 
 78 Stuntz, supra note 64, at 2560 (“[P]lea bargains outside the law’s shadow depend on prose-
cutors’ ability to make credible threats of severe post-trial sentences.”). 
 79 See, e.g., Russell D. Covey, Plea-Bargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
595, 613 (2013) (noting that “the size of the plea discount offered, the probability of conviction at 
trial, and the costs of contesting the case” are a defendant’s key considerations in determining 
whether to plead guilty). 
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accept in order to maximize their individual share of the resulting collective 
surplus.80 For example, if the parties are mutually pessimistic about their 
prospects at trial, they are relatively more likely to settle, if only to avoid 
their private costs of adjudication.81 Alternatively, if a prosecutor and a de-
fendant are mutually optimistic about their chances, they may fail to reach 
any agreement, choosing instead to gamble on a favorable adjudicated out-
come under the background default rules. Absent an inefficient failure of 
trade, this scenario implies that no settlement terms could produce a shara-
ble surplus. Nevertheless, defendants and prosecutors do not bargain with 
complete autonomy. They cannot always throttle their uncertainty and costs 
to optimize mutual net returns in the way parties to civil litigation often do. 
Instead, bargaining for criminal settlement is distinctive in that it is circum-
scribed by a necessary third party—the judge. 
B. The Judge as a Constraint on Settlement 
 Prosecutors and defendants have an inherent interest in pursuing set-
tlement whenever terms exist that will improve their respective lot relative 
to the default arrangement of a full criminal trial. Yet unlike in the civil con-
text, where parties are remarkably unfettered, there are forces in criminal 
litigation that constrain parties’ bargaining options. Prosecutors and defend-
ants deal in imprecise commodities, swapping procedural rights for various 
concessions in a world of statutorily set penalties. Moreover, any agreement 
the parties reach—no matter how meticulously they construct it to ensure 
their mutual benefit—cannot entirely eliminate uncertainty because it must 
still pass judicial muster. Criminal litigants can never fully settle their dis-
pute; rather, parties bargain and partially settle in the looming shadow of a 
judge serving as the gatekeeper to the state’s punitive power. 
 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 governs plea agreements at the 
federal level.82 The Rule explicitly regulates deals in which the defendant 
pleads guilty, but it is far broader in its practical influence and implications. 
                                                                                                                           
 80 Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 
1935 (1992) (stating that settlement represents the “gains split between the parties” of avoiding 
the cost of adjudication). 
 81 See John G. Douglass, Fatal Attraction? The Uneasy Courtship of Brady and Plea Bar-
gaining, 50 EMORY L.J. 437, 447 (2001). 
 82 As we note in the Introduction of this Article, we focus on federal rules and plea bargain-
ing in the federal courts for the sake of exposition. States have their own substantially similar 
analogs to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Some states mirror the federal system of per-
mitting sentencing proposals to be either binding or nonbinding on the judge, see, e.g., TENN. R. 
CRIM. P. 11, whereas other states leave the matter to judicial discretion, see, e.g., N.Y. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. § 220.60(3) (McKinney 2021). Regardless, the crucial ingredient for our argument is 
that all states require some form of judicial review and acceptance of criminal plea agreements. 
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Rule 11 describes the concessions the government may offer in return for a 
defendant’s waiving some or all of their procedural rights. A prosecutor can 
agree to: (A) not bring, or move to dismiss, other charges; (B) recommend, 
or agree not to oppose, the defendant’s request that a particular sentence or 
sentencing range is appropriate or that a particular provision of the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, a policy statement, or a sentencing factor does or 
does not apply; or (C) agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is 
the appropriate disposition of the case or that a particular provision of the 
Sentencing Guidelines, a policy statement, or a sentencing factor does or 
does not apply.83 This is by no means an exhaustive list of a prosecutor’s 
bargaining chips, but (B) and (C) do serve to mark the boundaries of what 
types of outcome concessions are legitimately on the table. 
 The defendant, in return, is permitted to waive some of their procedural 
rights—including the right to trial by jury, the right to remain silent, or the 
right to have the charges proven by the state.84 Not all rights can be waived, 
however. For instance, defendants cannot waive the constitutional prohibi-
tion on double jeopardy,85 nor can they accept an alternative standard of re-
view for determining guilt (such as “preponderance of the evidence”).86 Fur-
ther, defendants cannot consent to punishment in excess of what a statute 
permits,87 and they cannot agree to a proceeding that considers constitution-
ally impermissible factors (such as race or gender).88 Indeed, at some basic 
level, core notions of procedural justice must be maintained. In the colorful 
language of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit: “[T]here are 
limits to waiver; if the parties stipulated to trial by 12 orangutans the de-
fendant’s conviction would be invalid notwithstanding his consent, because 
some minimum of civilized procedure is required by community feeling re-
gardless of what the defendant wants or is willing to accept.”89 Rule 11 al-
                                                                                                                           
 83 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
 84 See generally King, supra note 30 (reviewing those features of criminal procedure that can 
and cannot be bartered away). 
 85 See Saul Levmore & Ariel Porat, Bargaining with Double Jeopardy, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 
273, 282–92 (2011). But cf. Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150–51 (2018) (holding that if 
a defendant consents to sever charges into multiple trials, there is no Double Jeopardy Clause 
violation if the first trial results in acquittal and the subsequent trial results in conviction). 
 86 See Fisher, supra note 30, at 945. 
 87 See, e.g., United States v. Feichtinger, 105 F.3d 1188, 1190 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing 
that a criminal defendant cannot agree to be sentenced to a term of incarceration “in excess of the 
statutory maximum”). 
 88 See United States v. Hicks, 129 F.3d 376, 377 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 89 See United States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585, 588 (7th Cir. 1985). Realize, though, that while 
a judge will not permit parties to empanel a jury of monkeys to resolve their dispute, a judge may 
allow parties to alter other procedures or reframe issues as a substitute capable of mimicking the 
perceived benefits or outcome of such a whimsical procedure. When it is in their mutual interest, 
parties will try to bargain around any restriction enforced by a judge. 
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lows plenty of play, but the universe of available criminal settlements has at 
least some (albeit ill-defined) boundaries.90 
 The judge is responsible for policing these boundaries, which happens 
in two main ways. First, Rule 11 (or an equivalent state counterpart) man-
dates that the judge seek a knowing and intelligent waiver of a defendant’s 
rights and advise the defendant of the maximum penalties and any mandato-
ry minimum penalties, including certain collateral consequences, flowing 
from a guilty plea.91 The judge must also ensure that the charge has some 
factual basis, meaning “that the conduct which the defendant admits consti-
tutes the offense charged in the indictment or information or an offense in-
cluded therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty.”92 This examina-
tion aims to “protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading voluntar-
ily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing 
that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.”93 Critically, a de-
fendant cannot barter away their right to this judicial examination.94 
The second way a judge polices criminal settlements is by imposing 
reasonable sentences on an individual convicted of a crime despite any party 
agreement to the contrary. If the parties’ recommended sentence departs 
from the Sentencing Guidelines’ range, for example, a judge may only im-
pose it if there are “justifiable reasons,” which the judge must then “set forth 
with specificity in the statement of reasons form.”95 In 2005, when the Su-
preme Court ruled in United States v. Booker that the federal Sentencing 
Guidelines were not mandatory but advisory, it effectively expanded judicial 
discretion by allowing judges to weigh almost any factor during sentenc-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Daniel P. Blank, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to 
Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2011, 2012 (2000) (arguing that courts 
have been unable to articulate a cogent explanation for why some rights are waivable and others 
are not). 
 91 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.  
 92 See, e.g., McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 467 (1969) (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment). 
 93 Id. (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment). 
 94 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (mandating the plea colloquy and its substance). 
 95 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(b)(2) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). “Justifia-
ble reasons” include: “(1) [the] circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of 
the defendant”; “(2) the need for the sentence imposed . . . (A) to reflect the offense’s seriousness, 
“promote respect for the law,” and “provide just punishment,” “(B) to afford adequate deter-
rence,” “(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant,” and “(D) to provide the 
defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional 
treatment”; “(3) the kinds of sentences available”; “(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing 
range” for the offense; “(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commis-
sion”; “(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities”; and “(7) the need to provide resti-
tution.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(7). 
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ing.96 Precedent even permits a sentencing judge to consider personal policy 
disagreements with the Sentencing Guidelines so long as the ultimate sen-
tence imposed is nevertheless “reasonable.”97 And although a sentence fall-
ing within the Guidelines is presumed reasonable, one falling outside the 
Guidelines is not presumed unreasonable.98 
 Judges wield many powers capable of shaping final outcomes. For in-
stance, judges can look beyond the parties’ presentation and consider charg-
es dropped during the parties’ negotiations. Judges may accept a criminal 
settlement providing for the dismissal of any charge—or an agreement not 
to pursue potential charges—only when “the remaining charges adequately 
reflect the seriousness of the actual offense behavior and . . . accepting the 
agreement will not undermine the statutory purposes of sentencing or the 
sentencing guidelines.”99 Thus, even if the prosecutor agrees to dismiss a 
charge, the judge may consider the underlying acts as “[r]elevant [c]onduct” 
and therefore as inputs to any sentence.100 True, the policy guidelines cau-
tion judges to defer to prosecutors, but they also add that “when the dismis-
sal of charges or agreement not to pursue potential charges is contingent on 
acceptance of a plea agreement, the court’s authority to adjudicate guilt and 
impose sentence is implicated.”101 The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s report 
for 2019 shows that 7.6% of upward Sentencing Guideline departures were 
due to dismissed and uncharged conduct.102 That figure was 18.1% in 
2016.103 Judges can and do impose sentencing outcomes beyond the appar-
ent bounds of parties’ settlement terms.104 
                                                                                                                           
 96 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 97 See Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007). 
 98 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 40–41 (2007). 
 99 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. cmt. 
 102 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING STATISTICS 102 tbl.41 (2019), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-
publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/2019-Annual-Report-and-Sourcebook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2H7F-CCTT]. 
 103 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2016 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at 
S-65 tbl.24 (2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2016/Table24.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGN4-MBLJ].  
 104 United States v. Fitch provides an extreme, yet illuminating, example of the potential im-
pact of uncharged conduct on sentencing. 659 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir. 2011). There, the govern-
ment charged the defendant with sixteen counts of fraud against his missing wife, who had disap-
peared under suspicious circumstances. Id. The jury convicted the defendant on those fraud 
charges. Id. During sentencing, however, the prosecution requested an upward departure based on 
the uncharged allegation that the defendant had actually murdered his wife in furtherance of his 
fraudulent acts. Id. at 793. A U.S. District Court Judge for the District of Nevada concluded that 
the defendant had in fact murdered his wife and sentenced him to 262 months, which was the 
statutory maximum for the fraud charges. Id. at 794. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
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 Despite this considerable discretion, some commentators stress that 
judges tend toward “rubberstamp[ing]” criminal settlement agreements ra-
ther than closely scrutinizing them.105 There are several reasons why some 
judges may take a less-than-active role in policing bargains. One of the most 
noted is that overburdened judges have an interest in approving settlements 
to lighten their own heavy caseloads.106 Time and effort matter to judges, 
too. Imposing a sentence recommended by the parties and within the appli-
cable federal Sentencing Guideline range allows a judge to avoid the addi-
tional work of justifying the imposed punishment and makes it less likely 
their decision will be appealed and, if appealed, reversed.107 Beyond this 
potentially self-serving efficiency, a judge may also feel strongly about en-
suring that a prosecutor and a defendant get the benefit of their bargain 
without undue judicial intrusion, essentially ignoring any third-party effects 
on crime rates or communities and the possibility of untoward but undetect-
ed pressure on the defendant.108 Parties should have the power, a judge 
might believe, to bargain over how best to structure the resolution of their 
dispute in line with their own interests. 
 But perhaps the most important reason why judges may tend not to ac-
tively (or at least successfully) police criminal settlements is that parties are 
often adept at evading meaningful judicial review.109 By manipulating the 
contours of their dispute, prosecutors and defendants can present scenarios 
that hide material facts that a judge might otherwise consider in exercising 
discretion. For instance, parties can bargain over which and how charges are 
presented to a judge, provide joint sentencing factor recommendations, and 
offer fabricated accounts of the defendant’s criminal history so as to con-
                                                                                                                           
Circuit affirmed the sentence under the due deference standard. Id. at 799. For a broad discussion 
of Fitch, see generally Robert Alan Semones, Note, A Parade of Horribles: Uncharged Relevant 
Conduct, the Federal Prosecutorial Loophole, Tails Wagging Dogs in Federal Sentencing Law, 
and United States v. Fitch, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313, 348 (2012). 
 105 McConkie, supra note 29, at 66; see also Frank S. Gilbert, Commentary, The Probation 
Officer’s Perception of the Allocation of Discretion, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 109, 109 (1991) (quot-
ing one jurist who likened his role “to that of a ‘notary public’”). 
 106 See, e.g., Cynthia Alkon, The U.S. Supreme Court’s Failure to Fix Plea Bargaining: The 
Impact of Lafler and Frye, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 561, 589–90 (2014) (“Judges . . . rely on 
plea bargaining to manage their caseloads.”); Bibas, supra note 5, at 2542 n.349 (“[Judges] have 
little reputational incentive to scrutinize plea bargains carefully . . . .”); Bert I. Huang, Lightened 
Scrutiny, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1143 (2011) (exploring the “spillover effects” of docket pres-
sure on judicial review). 
 107 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–50 (2007). 
 108 This was not always the case. It was not until the nineteenth century, as assistance of 
counsel in criminal proceedings became more common, that courts felt “[r]elieved of the duty to 
protect the defendant from his own bad judgment, [and] . . . could not as easily justify disturbing 
agreements to forego procedural protections.” King, supra note 30, at 121. 
 109 See, e.g., HEUMANN, supra note 32, at 43. 
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strain the range of plausible punitive outcomes at the judge’s disposal.110 
Importantly, the presentencing reports of probation officers, which are 
meant to inform the judge about relevant sentencing factors and to provide 
an independent check on the parties, are often incomplete or lack sufficient 
evidence to justify a judge’s reliance on them when they contradict the par-
ties’ factual stipulations.111 Further inquiry is time consuming and costly. 
Without a reliable alternate account, a judge may feel significant pressure to 
accept the parties’ predictably misleading presentation. 
 Even though prosecutors and defendants can successfully evade judi-
cial review of settlement terms in some instances, attempting to do so is 
both costly and risky. For this reason, it would be wrong to ignore entirely 
the constraints that judicial discretion places on criminal settlement behav-
ior. The specter of an inquisitive judge who might reject an agreement be-
tween the parties or, worse, partially unwind or alter the agreement and then 
accept it—thereby defeating the parties’ intentions—informs the way prose-
cutors and defendants structure and accomplish their bargains. Parties can 
never be certain of how their settlements will play out before the court, but 
this in no way implies that settlement cannot continue to be mutually bene-
ficial. Parties simply incorporate the judicial wildcard into their calculations 
and further adjust their preferred terms according to their interests in cost 
and risk minimization and value maximization. 
II. CRIMINAL SETTLEMENT AS PARTIAL SETTLEMENT 
 All agreements between prosecutors and defendants—including tradi-
tional plea bargains—are best understood as partial settlements. All settle-
ment exists along a spectrum, with “pure trial” (no party agreement at all—
or a tacit agreement not to agree) at one end, in which background default 
rules and endowments govern completely, and “pure settlement” at the oth-
er, in which parties wholly supplant defaults with their own rules and out-
comes, usually resolving the dispute outright.112 Prosecutors and defendants 
are unable to “purely settle” out of court as parties often do in the civil con-
text, but they are just as able to enter into other settlement agreements, ex-
changing certain concessions whenever doing so is to their mutual benefit. 
Conceptually, these concessions can be divided into three nonexclusive cat-
egories of modifications depending on which default terms they address. 
                                                                                                                           
 110 See, e.g., King, supra note 19, at 297; Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Nego-
tiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in 
the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1292 (1997). 
 111 King, supra note 19, at 303. 
 112 Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 62. 
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Agreements can modify (A) the procedures the court and parties will use to 
reach a decision in the case, (B) the substantive issues to be resolved by any 
adjudication, and (C) the outcomes potentially available.  
 Procedure-, issue-, and outcome-modification agreements can be re-
styled as simply categories of deal terms, which parties can combine to alter 
costs, adjust uncertainty levels, or shift expected outcomes. Terms can work 
together as mutually reinforcing complements or offer alternative strategies 
as substitutes. Although some terms can be characterized as belonging to 
more than one of these three categories, and parties regularly trade terms 
from multiple categories simultaneously, we address each category separate-
ly. By defining boundaries, we can review more clearly how these modifica-
tions operate to generate surplus for parties. It also allows us to flesh out the 
theoretical implications and practical consequences of criminal settlement in 
the shadow of significant judicial discretion. While each type of modifica-
tion operates differently, they all work to sidestep the constraints and costs 
imposed by background rules so that parties can make the most of their situ-
ation given the judge’s role and power. 
A. Procedure-Modification Agreements 
 A procedure-modification agreement is one in which the parties agree 
to change the rules by which their dispute will be resolved. That is, the par-
ties agree to operate according to procedures that diverge from those that a 
statute, constitution, common law, or court rule establishes for determining 
the defendant’s guilt or punishment. Procedure modifications are central to 
most criminal settlement agreements because often a defendant’s most valu-
able bargaining assets are procedural in nature (or can be so construed), and 
in practice prosecutors can most readily conserve resources and reduce risk 
by circumventing certain default procedures.113 Criminal processes can be 
modified through agreements that include a bundle of procedural changes, 
such as a defendant agreeing to forgo adjudication on guilt completely,114 or 
a la carte procedural changes, such as a defendant agreeing only to waive 
the right to appeal their conviction or sentence. Again, parties agree to mod-
                                                                                                                           
 113 Defendants regularly bargain away their procedural rights in bulk by deciding to decline a 
trial on the merits and advance with little delay to sentencing by the judge, thereby creating value 
for the state by bypassing trial and its associated burdens. 
 114 A defendant forgoing adjudication altogether by entering an open guilty plea amounts to a 
settlement agreement in our view because prosecutors can object to any guilty plea, though this 
rarely if ever occurs. Defendants sometimes plead guilty unilaterally in hopes of receiving a leni-
ent sentence from the judge or reducing their litigation costs. Of course, a guilty plea is far more 
often a term the defendant exchanges with the prosecutor for something of value.  
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ify default procedures to advance their mutual interests by lowering costs, 
reducing risk, or improving ex ante returns. 
 The first-to-mind example of what can be described as a procedure-
modification is wholly predictable: the defendant offers to plead guilty to a 
charge, completely waiving all procedural rights to any adjudication of guilt 
(but not necessarily other post-conviction procedural rights), and to proceed 
directly to sentencing by a judge, which, if unaccompanied by any other 
agreement between the two parties, is simply called an “open plea.”115 Im-
portantly, waiving adjudicatory procedures is essentially outcome determi-
native, so entering a guilty plea can also be characterized as (and overlaps 
with) an issue modification. A guilty plea alone is akin to civil litigants 
agreeing to a bifurcated lawsuit in which the question of liability is resolved 
but the issue of damages remains; the parties have agreed to resolve only a 
subset of their dispute by adjudication.116 But regardless of how we label it, 
just as in civil litigation, an open guilty plea allows both sides to avoid the 
litigation costs and risks associated with the default processes for adjudicat-
ing responsibility and instead frees them to concentrate their resources on 
influencing the sentence the decision-maker must select. 
 As an extreme, blunt form of procedure or issue modification, a guilty 
plea may not be the obvious place to start our discussion of the wide variety 
of criminal settlement terms. Yet a defendant’s agreement to plead guilty is 
so common that it is not just assumed to be the most frequent form of crimi-
nal settlement; rather, the traditional plea-bargaining framework has com-
pletely eclipsed broader notions of criminal settlement in academic and pol-
icy discussions.117 Nevertheless, even typical plea deals illustrate the under-
lying mechanisms of our broader theory of criminal settlement. Agreements 
by a defendant to skip the default procedures for determining guilt are of-
                                                                                                                           
 115 The perceived benefits of open pleas from the defendant’s perspective will turn on, among 
other considerations, the strength of the state’s evidence as well as the judge’s expected response 
at sentencing. See Nancy J. King & Michael E. O’Neill, Appeal Waivers and the Future of Sen-
tencing Policy, 55 DUKE L.J. 209, 240 n.100 (2005) (“[It d]epends on the judge, whether you 
want an open plea. . . . If I went in with an open plea and the government is going to present all of 
this relevant conduct and the court might be receptive to finding by a preponderance that the rele-
vant conduct occurred, it’s a risk. [It is d]ifferent if there is no relevant conduct. If there is, you’d 
want to stipulate.” (quoting a phone interview with a public defender) (alterations in original) 
(citation omitted)); see also id. at 233 n.87 (“[A]bout 25–30% of the open pleas are in meth cases. 
The penalties are so outrageous, and they have a hard time proving quantity. And even with ac-
ceptance they don’t give you much.” (quoting a phone interview with a public defender) (altera-
tion in original)). 
 116 See Michael Abramowicz & Sarah Abramowicz, Bifurcating Settlements, 86 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 376, 382 (2018) (discussing bifurcation of civil lawsuits and its benefits for driving set-
tlement in the civil context). 
 117 See supra notes 24–29 and accompanying text. 
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ten—though not inevitably—exchanged for a prosecutor’s reciprocal prom-
ise to the defendant, such as an offer to drop certain charges or to propose to 
the judge that a less severe sentence is more appropriate.118 These are issue- 
or outcome-related terms, and in practice they are fellow travelers with pro-
cedure modifications, best thought of as highly complementary to a guilty 
plea. That is, issue and outcome modifications may enhance the perceived 
value of a given procedure modification. In fact, additional settlement terms 
of this sort may be necessary to render the entire package of modifications 
attractive to both parties (and implicitly the judge). 
 But prosecutors and defendants agree to modify procedures in many 
other ways beyond guilty pleas, and examples show how fine-grained such 
procedural settlements can be. For instance, short of waiving adjudication 
altogether, a defendant can maintain their innocence while agreeing to sub-
mit the issue of guilt to an alternative adjudicator.119 In the federal courts, 
options include a jury of fewer than twelve persons (though not less than 
six),120 an Article III district court judge,121 or a federal magistrate judge.122 
The parties may simultaneously prefer one of these factfinders, a preference 
that may be attributable to each of them entertaining optimistic, and there-
fore inconsistent, beliefs that the new adjudicator will produce a more fa-
vorable outcome for them than the default decision-maker.123 Like a deal to 
waive trial, an agreement regarding the type of adjudicator is often (but not 
always) coupled with additional procedure modifications. For instance, at 
least in some courts, bench trials are regularly accompanied by the defend-
ant’s waiver of their right to cross-examine witnesses or their right to testify 
in their own defense.124 Truncating proceedings in this way can save re-
sources for both parties (and possibly reduce risk) while still permitting 
them to speculate on their mutually optimistic beliefs about the likely out-
come by adjudicating the remainder of their dispute.125 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Federal statistics on the rate of guilty pleas entered without any agreement from the prose-
cutor—an “open plea”—are seemingly unreliable. See King & O’Neill, supra note 115, at 228 
n.76. Yet logic and informal observation suggest that open pleas are comparatively rare, as parties 
will typically benefit more from bargaining across multiple dimensions.  
 119 FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(a) (allowing waiver of a jury trial with the consent of the government 
and approval by the court). 
 120 See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 n.16 (1973). 
 121 See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 299 (1930). 
 122 See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936 (1991). 
 123 See King, supra note 30, at 155. 
 124 See Nancy J. King et al., When Process Affects Punishment: Differences in Sentences After 
Guilty Plea, Bench Trial, and Jury Trial in Five Guidelines States, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 979 
n.77 (2005) (quoting a Washington state public defender as stating that a bench trial “doesn’t 
have the flavor of a trial [and] is really like the conditional plea” (alteration in original)). 
 125 As one public defender explained the benefits of a bench trial: 
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 The adjudicative procedure the parties select for determining guilt can 
have a dramatic effect on any final sanction the court is likely to mete out, 
which provides easy insight into why settling parties “care” about proce-
dures—procedures influence outcomes. To offer one example to make the 
point, a sizeable literature explores the so-called “trial penalty,” in which 
judges supposedly inflict harsher sentences on those defendants who choose 
to proceed to full adjudication rather than enter a guilty plea; indeed, some 
studies of federal court data show an average sixty-four percent longer sen-
tence for those who stick with a default jury trial.126 In general, sentences 
that follow a guilty plea are likely to be the least punitive, sentences that 
follow jury trials are likely to be the most punitive, and sentences that fol-
low bench trials fall somewhere in between.127 This sentencing disparity is 
surely a strong motivator for a defendant, even one not financially responsi-
ble for their own representation, to enter into a procedure-modification 
agreement. The fact that parties often harbor divergent opinions about how a 
given adjudicator is likely to respond to a guilty plea can account for their 
ability to come to terms: “The defendant may plead guilty expecting that the 
judge will find him sympathetic and sentence him to probation,” while 
“[t]he prosecution, in contrast, may hope that the same plea will result in 
one year’s imprisonment.”128 By swapping out the adjudicator, the parties 
mutually optimize given their respective beliefs and preferences. 
                                                                                                                           
If the jury feels really strongly, it puts pressure on the judge at sentencing. If the de-
fendant has committed a really heinous crime, he might want a bench trial. There is 
less press coverage, [which] leaves [the] judge with less pressure to respond harsh-
ly. So if you have someone with no redeeming character, [you] can spend less time 
in front of the jury seeking an acquittal that is unlikely anyway, [and] more time ar-
guing about sentence. Bench trials tend to be really horrible crimes. The defense at-
torney thinks, ok, I can shorten this up by going to bench trial and it may help out at 
sentence. 
Id. at 981 (alterations in original). And, when asked why the prosecutor might agree, the defender 
responded: “[T]he prosecutor knows he’s not going to lose the conviction, and it is more efficient. 
Plus prosecutors want to avoid the risk of having one lone juror hang it up. He’s handed an easier 
conviction and will take it, even if sentencing might be a bit more lenient.” Id. (alteration in orig-
inal). 
 126 See, e.g., Andrew Chongseh Kim, Underestimating the Trial Penalty: An Empirical Anal-
ysis of the Federal Trial Penalty and Critique of the Abrams Study, 84 MISS. L.J. 1195, 1200 
(2015) (offering a comprehensive review of the trial penalty and noting the 64% figure). But see 
David S. Abrams, Putting the Trial Penalty on Trial, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 777, 783 (2013) (arguing 
that plea bargains actually result in longer sentences than trials). 
 127 See, e.g., King et al., supra note 124, at 963; Thomas M. Uhlman & N. Darlene Walker, 
“He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His”: An Analysis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in 
Jury Cases, 14 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 323, 328 (1980). 
 128 Bibas, supra note 5, at 2500. 
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 Rather than bypassing adjudication altogether or agreeing to an alterna-
tive decision-maker, the parties may prefer to operate largely within the con-
fines of standard trial procedures but with relatively minor a la carte modi-
fications concerning discrete aspects of their proceedings.129 That is, a pros-
ecutor and a defendant might mutually consent to waive limited trial rights 
(such as by agreeing to specific trial time limits, witness rules, or eviden-
tiary concessions) in exchange for some amount of limited prosecutorial 
leniency while nevertheless still adjudicating their dispute.130 An interesting 
example of this identified by Gregory Gilchrist involved a murder defendant 
waiving his constitutional right to confront an unavailable medical examiner 
who had performed an autopsy of the victim in exchange for the prosecutor 
not entering certain graphic photographs of the victim into evidence.131 
These kinds of seemingly small procedural concessions may have real pay-
offs by allowing the parties to preserve resources, mitigate risk, and take 
advantage of their private, subjective information while still adjudicating 
(mostly) within the traditional procedural system.132 
 An especially common (and useful) a la carte procedure-modification 
term is an appeal waiver. A defendant’s right to appeal any conviction, sen-
tence, or both is valuable to the government because the appeals process can 
be expensive and time consuming. It also poses a risk that the resources in-
vested in obtaining the conviction will all be for naught. Prosecutors may 
therefore be apt to make more valuable and substantial concessions in ex-
change for a waiver of this procedural right. Prosecutors offer various forms 
of consideration (indeed, modifications of all types) such as “[binding] ‘C 
pleas,’ downward departures, safety-valve credits, and a variety of stipula-
tions to facts that determine[] sentences under the Guidelines” in exchange 
for a defendant agreeing to waive the right to appeal.133 Importantly, prose-
cutors may offer some of these benefits even when the defendant insists on 
                                                                                                                           
 129 Scholars have intensively studied this breed of partial settlement in the civil context, gen-
erating a healthy literature on “contract procedure[]” that often dominates discussions. See, e.g., 
David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 605, 611 (2010); see also David Marcus, The Perils of Contract Procedure: A Revised His-
tory of Forum Selection Clauses in the Federal Courts, 82 TUL. L. REV. 973, 995 (2008). 
 130 Gilchrist, supra note 30, at 622. 
 131 See Commonwealth v. Leng, 979 N.E.2d 199, 205 (Mass. 2012); Gilchrist, supra note 30, 
at 622. 
 132 See Gilchrist, supra note 30, at 623 (arguing that “to the extent counsel can identify ways 
of streamlining the trial, or even making the trial less burdensome on the prosecution or particular 
witnesses, doing so can be exchanged for leniency”). 
 133 King & O’Neill, supra note 115, at 212–13 (footnotes omitted). 
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proceeding to a full trial in every other sense.134 That is, the parties engage 
in a typical criminal trial conducted according to default procedures for ad-
judicating guilt but also ex ante “settle” the appeal (usually in exchange for 
an outcome-modification concession from the prosecutor) because the pros-
ecutor values appellate rights more than the defendant does.135 A guilty plea 
is not necessary for both parties to advance their interests. 
 Appeal waivers have other settlement benefits as well. They can en-
hance—i.e., complement—the usefulness of other procedural terms, making 
them relatively more likely to occur together as part of a settlement agree-
ment. Consider a type of agreement reached during trial in which “the de-
fendant and the government agree that it is in their interest to dispense with 
a certain procedure so long as the defendant waives any right to appeal his 
conviction based on the absence of that procedure.”136 Nancy King offers an 
illuminating example of this exchange out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit; there, a prosecutor “[c]orrectly anticipating that [the de-
fendant] would claim that his attorneys were ineffective in allowing him to 
waive his presence, . . . secured, in open court, [the defendant’s] waiver of 
any claim that counsel was deficient in allowing him to waive his presence 
at jury selection.”137 Such a waiver ensures that the defendant cannot use 
their appellate rights to unwind an earlier understanding. Just as it can be 
rational for an army to burn the bridge behind it, an appellate waiver can be 
a useful commitment device, creating value for a prosecutor, a part of which 
a defendant can then demand at trial in the form of some other favorable 
                                                                                                                           
 134 King, supra note 30, at 148 (“A defendant convicted after trial may decide that the prose-
cution’s recommendation of a lower sentence is worth giving up the right to appeal his convic-
tion, his sentence, or both.”). 
 135 Or consider that the parties might agree at some early stage that the defendant will not 
seek to expunge or seal conviction records in exchange for some prosecutorial concession. Cf. 
Andrea Amulic, Note, Humanizing the Corporation While Dehumanizing the Individual: The 
Misuse of Deferred-Prosecution Agreements in the United States, 116 MICH. L. REV. 123, 150–51 
(2017) (discussing the benefits of expungement and the different approaches states employ for 
seeking it). Such a hypothetical procedural agreement could complement an issue modification 
even without a plea, such as the prosecutor agreeing to a lesser charge. Cf. supra note 76. 
 136 King, supra note 30, at 148. 
 137 Id. at 161 n.151 (quoting Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 673 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). 
Appeal waivers can take many forms. A defendant’s agreement to waive their right to challenge a 
sentence might be used separately as a substitute or in conjunction as a complement with a waiver 
of an ineffective assistance claim to tailor the agreement in line with the parties’ interests. See 
King & O’Neill, supra note 115, at 231, 244 (noting that 65% of a random sample of federal plea 
agreements include some form of waiver of review, with approximately 28% of these agreements 
including a specific exemption for ineffective assistance claims). 
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term. In effect, appeal waivers liberate parties to construct arrangements that 
may not otherwise withstand judicial scrutiny.138 
 These previous examples all involve parties continuing to operate with-
in the established set of default procedures or modifying them around the 
edges. According to our theory, these partial settlements create value for 
both sides by reducing risk, lowering litigation costs, or improving expected 
outcomes. Their “around the edges” quality hints that most if not virtually 
all criminal trials are “partially settled” because even small pockets of po-
tential mutual improvement can be accessed by the parties. Note, though, 
that litigants need not always design new procedures from the ground up. 
Instead, jurisdictions around the country have regularly offered cohesive 
procedural packages—“pre-fab” alternatives to default rules, ones designed 
in advance by nonparties. These packages can help lower negotiation costs 
and reduce asymmetric information concerns in procedural bargaining: a 
defendant might smell a skunk if a prosecutor offers a complicated package 
of procedural adjustments out of the blue.139 
 The most widely studied of these pre-fab procedural packages are 
known as “slow pleas of guilty” from Pittsburgh and Philadelphia state 
courts during the 1960s and 1970s.140 Those cities implemented procedural 
systems involving waiver of the right to a jury trial but not waiver of the 
right to a trial before a judge—essentially a special type of bench trial, with 
judges who were known at the time for being particularly lenient.141 During 
the hearing, the defendant was required to stipulate both to the truth and the 
admissibility of the police report; and though the defendant could not “con-
tradict” the police report, they could “explain” and “supplement” it before 
the judge. Defense attorneys in Philadelphia reported that defendants usual-
                                                                                                                           
 138 The Supreme Court recently stated that “no appeal waiver serves as an absolute bar to all 
appellate claims” and that “even the broadest appeal waiver does not deprive a defendant of all 
appellate claims.” See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738, 744–45, 749–50 (2019). As we argue, the 
threat of judicial review affects the value of settlement terms. If courts regularly undo negotiated 
appeal waivers, parties will adjust and find value elsewhere (even though some erstwhile surplus 
might remain unobtainable). 
 139 We might think of these arrangements as akin to expedited or summary jury trials in civil 
cases. Expedited jury trials are public proceedings before a judge but with circumscribed proce-
dures such that a decision is reached rapidly, often within a single day. See generally NAT’L CTR. 
FOR STATE CTS., SHORT, SUMMARY & EXPEDITED: THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL JURY TRIALS 
(2019), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/18083/shortsummaryexpedited-online-
rev.pdf [https://perma.cc/HK5M-8VF9] (reviewing expedited programs around the United States). 
 140 See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alterna-
tives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 1033–34 (1983); Stephen J. 
Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1147–48 (1984). 
 141 Alschuler, supra note 3, at 725 (explaining that these bench trials provided much faster 
and lower risk versions of full trials while still allowing the defendant “to present his side of the 
story to an impartial third party . . . [and] not surrender his chance for acquittal”). 
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ly agreed to this package of procedure modifications because the presiding 
judges were more lenient than those assigned in other nonjury trials—i.e., 
the waivers came with a lower expected sentence and (perhaps) less uncer-
tainty.142 Further sweetening the deal, it was purportedly understood among 
the parties that the district attorney’s office would allow any defendant sen-
tenced following such a proceeding to obtain a new, full trial without proce-
dural restrictions.143 This bundle thus served a signaling function to risk-
averse defendants while also preserving the state’s resources by not provid-
ing each defendant with a “Cadillac” trial. 
 A more recent example of a procedure-modification package is the 
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children 
Today Act (“PROTECT Act”) of 2003 at the federal level. The law permits 
certain, heavily burdened federal judicial districts to offer “fast-track” or 
“early disposition” procedures to quickly resolve cases involving immigra-
tion crimes.144 Under its terms, a defendant who promptly (pre-indictment) 
pleads guilty to a fast-track eligible crime and agrees to waive certain pretri-
al and post-conviction rights receives various concessions and dramatic 
Guideline departure recommendations from the prosecutor.145 This early 
disposition program appears to be particularly valuable to defendants. In 
2019, for instance, those convicted via these procedures received a sentence 
that was shorter by a median of 42% and a mean of 46.5%.146 This bundle is 
also attractive to the government because of the substantial burden prosecut-
ing immigration crimes entails. In 2019, immigration crimes comprised 
38.4% of all criminal charges brought in the federal courts.147 In effect, the 
                                                                                                                           
 142 Id. 
 143 Alschuler, supra note 140, at 1036 n.485. 
 144 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 
2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(m), 117 Stat. 650, 675 (codified as amended at 
28 U.S.C. § 994) (authorizing the promulgation of downward sentencing departures as part of an 
early disposition program). Note that the first fast-track programs for handling immigration 
crimes were implemented by U.S. Attorneys in the mid-1990s without any congressional warrant, 
with anecdotal evidence suggesting that as many as half of them developed some form of fast-
track program. See Thomas E. Gorman, Comment, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading 
Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 479, 485–86 (2010). 
 145 See United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F. Supp. 2d 943, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“The 
purpose of these programs was and is to facilitate prompt and easy disposition of cases to reduce 
the burdens they impose in those districts . . . .”). 
 146 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 102, at 99 tbl.38; see also United States v. Marcial-
Santiago, 447 F.3d 715, 718–19 (9th Cir. 2006) (“In light of Congress’s explicit authorization of 
fast-track programs in the PROTECT Act, we cannot say that the disparity between Appellants’ 
sentences and the sentences imposed on similarly-situated defendants in fast-track districts is 
‘unwarranted’ within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6). . . . It is justified by the benefits gained by the 
government when defendants plead guilty early in criminal proceedings.” (citations omitted) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6))). 
 147 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 102, at 45 fig.2. 
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PROTECT Act assembled alternative procedures to induce settlement, em-
powering the government to manage its caseload while offering the accused 
valuable concessions. 
Beyond these existing pre-fab bundles and a la carte swaps, there is a 
growing scholarly conversation that aims to identify hypothetical procedure-
modification agreements through which parties might conceivably realize 
mutual gains.148 Talia Fisher suggests that prosecutors and defendants may 
benefit from the liberty to negotiate alternative standards of proof—
changing “beyond a reasonable doubt” to “preponderance of the evidence,” 
for example—which would free mutually optimistic parties to proceed to 
trial with their dispute more finely manicured to better align with their ex-
pectations about the evidence.149 Similarly, Saul Levmore and Ariel Porat 
recommend allowing parties to dicker over the prohibition on double jeop-
ardy, which could lower the costs of trial by reducing the incentives for 
prosecutors to overinvest in their one bite at the apple.150 And Russell Gold 
and his collaborators propose a fee-shifting scheme in which acquitted de-
fendants may obtain fees from the prosecutor’s office in order to alleviate 
the economic burden of a full-throated defense.151 In theory, criminal proce-
dures are infinitely malleable, allowing parties to adjust their risks and in-
terests with precision—so long as the law does not prohibit the agreement 
and the judge approves (or is unaware) of the terms. 
More than their legal permissibility, however, the plausibility of these 
theoretical modifications turns on prosecutors and defendants each finding 
benefits sufficient to justify their respective concessions.152 Not every theo-
retical bargain is likely to offer sufficient gains to justify a real-world coun-
terpart. And criminal settlement can be complicated by the lumpiness of cer-
tain settlement terms. For example, the dichotomous nature of double jeop-
ardy (a defendant cannot waive fifty percent of the right) implies that a 
prosecutor would need to offer a sufficiently attractive term or set of terms 
to induce complete waiver. But in the Supreme Court’s words, “A defendant 
can ‘maximize’ what he has to ‘sell’ only if he is permitted to offer what the 
prosecutor is most interested in buying.”153 And, as Nancy King reminds us, 
                                                                                                                           
 148 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-conviction Review, and Sorting Crim-
inal Prosecutions by Guilt or Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009, 1011 (2012) (proposing 
that defendants might “waive major procedural rights at trial, in return for important procedural 
advantages on post-conviction review”). 
 149 Fisher, supra note 30, at 945. 
 150 Levmore & Porat, supra note 85, at 282–92. 
 151 Gold et al., supra note 30, at 1655. 
 152 See, e.g., King, supra note 30, at 124 (arguing that prosecutors are unlikely to find a 
standard of review alteration to be a valuable concession). 
 153 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 208 (1995). 
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“[T]he market for some rights may yet emerge . . . .”154 Unbridling parties’ 
creative bargaining power may nudge them to experiment with procedural 
structures involving rights beyond a defendant’s right to a trial. 
B. Issue-Modification Agreements 
An issue-modification agreement is one in which the parties agree to 
change the underlying substance of their dispute.155 Rather than amending 
the governing procedures or altering the sanctions associated with any par-
ticular verdict or plea, a prosecutor and a defendant mutually agree to 
change the issues that need to be resolved in the belief that doing so will 
advance their respective interests. The literature has traditionally referred to 
negotiating over such settlement terms in the criminal context as “charge 
bargaining” because parties often agree to an exchange in which the prose-
cutor promises to amend the charges facing the defendant.156 Yet issue modi-
fications can stretch far beyond modifying the alleged crimes. They can in-
clude reconstituting the specific elements of crimes, reframing relevant 
facts, and agreeing on the factors for the judge to consider in determining 
and imposing a sentence.157 Critically, these reconstructions can be entirely 
detached from reality and even the initial charging document. As Thea John-
son observes, “[E]verything has become a bargaining chip” when parties 
attempt to resolve criminal disputes, even “truth itself.”158 
The issues in dispute between a prosecutor and a defendant—and over 
which they can bargain—may be discrete or divisible. That is, the parties 
may agree that certain charges are no longer in dispute at all, or they may 
settle on the defendant stipulating to certain elements of a single offense (or 
to something wanting in an available affirmative defense).159 They may also 
settle on a particular value or range of values (e.g., of stolen goods) or, al-
ternatively, agree that certain values are off the table.160 Defendants can at 
                                                                                                                           
 154 King, supra note 30, at 124.  
 155 Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 98. 
 156 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 157 See Johnson, supra note 28, at 891. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See King, supra note 30, at 124 (“[T]he defendant perceives a benefit from agreeing to 
accept as proven certain elements of a criminal offense, and the prosecutor values not having to 
prove those elements at trial.”). Or consider a case in which a defendant stipulates to two (but not 
all) elements of a charge—that the property was not the defendant’s and that it was worth over 
$1,000—in exchange for the prosecutor agreeing to dismiss twenty-one other charges. See State v. 
Jaroma, 660 A.2d 1131, 1133 (N.H. 1995). 
 160 Stephen J. Schulhofer and Ilene H. Nagel note, importantly, “that circumvention is more 
likely to occur in . . . [contexts] in which the Guidelines prescribe sentences that are anchored to 
mandatory minimums, than in many offense categories . . . in which the Guidelines’ prescribed 
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times benefit from unilaterally stipulating to elements or incriminating facts. 
For instance, doing so can reduce a prosecutor’s incentive to offer evidence 
that could influence a jury’s perception of a secondary issue in the case, 
known as the “‘halo’ effect.”161 In a production-of-child-pornography case, a 
defendant might agree to stipulate that a depicted individual is under eight-
een years of age (reducing the expense, effort, and uncertainty for the prose-
cutor of attempting to prove the same) while still arguing that it was reason-
able to be deceived as to that fact.162 Or the parties might conclude that liti-
gating certain issues is too costly given the likely outcomes on those ques-
tions, even if the case as a whole remains viable.163 For example, a defend-
ant might stipulate that a firearm moved in interstate commerce (a fact that 
is often readily established by the location of the gun’s manufacturer) but 
challenge, say, whether they had possession of the weapon at an otherwise 
full-blown trial.164 Indeed, parties can and do settle the parts of a case that 
make sense for them to settle while continuing to litigate the remaining is-
sues in order to make the most of their respective positions. 
It is worth emphasizing the potentially vital risk-reduction benefits that 
can accrue from settling even just some issues. Overcriminalization means 
that creative prosecutors can craft complex indictments, picking and choos-
ing which crimes to bring (and under what conditions) to amplify a defend-
                                                                                                                           
sentences are anchored by past sentencing practice.” Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 110, at 
1285. 
 161 See Edith Greene & Elizabeth F. Loftus, When Crimes Are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 193, 194 (1985) (explaining a juror’s tendency to view a defendant in light of all charges 
the prosecutor brings); Andrew D. Leipold & Hossein A. Abbasi, The Impact of Joinder and Sev-
erance on Federal Criminal Cases: An Empirical Study, 59 VAND. L. REV. 349, 355 (2006) 
(“[T]he more counts in the indictment, the quicker the jury may be to assume that the accused 
must be guilty of something.”). 
 162 Anne E. Di Salvo, Note, United States v. Malloy: Unreasonably Denying Criminal De-
fendants a Reasonable Mistake of Age Defense in the Fourth Circuit, 69 MD. L. REV. 1020, 1031–
32 (2010) (considering the legal viability of this defense and reviewing United States v. U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California, 858 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1988), in which the 
defendants “stipulated to the fact that the girl appearing in their film was a minor, [but] argued 
that they were greatly deceived as to her true age”). 
 163 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 140, at 944 (discussing the “process costs” that a defend-
ant incurs, such as attorney’s fees and other costs, by contesting the charges against them); Note, 
Costs and the Plea Bargaining Process: Reducing the Price of Justice to the Nonindigent Defend-
ant, 89 YALE L.J. 333, 333 (1979) (“The present system of cost allocation . . . creates a strong 
incentive for nonindigent defendants to plead guilty.”). 
 164 Such agreements are not uncommon. See, e.g., United States v. Simplice, 687 F. App’x 
850, 851–53 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (defendant stipulated that the firearm at issue had trav-
eled across state lines but challenged at a jury trial “whether he had actual possession of [it]”); 
United States v. Mosley, 339 F. App’x 568, 571 (6th Cir. 2009) (defendant stipulated both to the 
fact that he had a previous felony conviction and that the firearm had traveled in interstate com-
merce but contested at a bench trial whether he was in possession of the firearm). 
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ant’s exposure, making defenses more costly and outcomes more unpredict-
able.165 Imagine how a simple drug-possession case can be easily combined 
with charges for possession of drug paraphernalia, conspiracy to distribute, 
and even child endangerment. Prosecutors can use such “charge stacking” to 
threaten defendants with extreme sentences to pressure them into making 
concessions.166 Thus, in practical terms, there are nearly certain to be multi-
ple issues over which a prosecutor and a defendant can negotiate and several 
concessions they can trade, thus making one or more exchanges more likely 
than if there were just a single issue in dispute.167 A prosecutor is able to 
offer to drop certain charges—such as swapping a burglary charge (a felony) 
for a criminal trespass charge (a misdemeanor)—if the defendant in return 
agrees to extend a benefit to the prosecutor, such as waiving a certain de-
fense or cooperating in some other criminal matter. In so doing, the parties 
alter the foundation of their dispute, leaving in the agreement’s wake an en-
tirely different dispute to be resolved. 
Issue modifications can be so dramatic that they effectively morph an 
“actual” dispute into a truly fictional scenario. A defendant may be convict-
ed of “an offense that the defendant did not commit, and that all the parties 
in the case know the defendant did not commit.”168 Although the judge is 
required to ensure that there is a factual basis behind any plea, “[i]n prac-
tice, [this] . . . requirement rarely hinders an effort to plead guilty.”169 Such 
settlements can be powerful tools to shape the range of likely consequences 
that will follow from any criminal conviction. As Thea Johnson explains, 
“Fictional pleas—through minor sleights of hand or outright manipulation 
of facts or law—avoid deportation and other collateral consequences, while 
allowing the prosecutor to secure a disposition in the criminal case.”170 Even 
Justice Stevens has recognized the benefits of such issue-modification 
                                                                                                                           
 165 See Irby v. United States, 390 F.2d 432, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (en banc) (Bazelon, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[O]ften it takes nothing more than a fertile imagination to spin several crimes out of 
a single transaction.”). 
 166 Cf. Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing for Violent and Drug Trafficking Crimes Involving 
Firearms: Recent Changes and Prospects for Improvement, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 41, 53–57 
(2000) (reviewing a study showing that prosecutors did not bring or ultimately dropped federal 
gun charges in more than half of the cases in which gun charges that carried consecutive sentenc-
es appeared to be available and/or appropriate). 
 167 See Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 108–09 (making this point in the civil context); cf. 
Donald G. Gifford, A Context-Based Theory of Strategy Selection in Legal Negotiations, 46 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 41, 55–56 (1985) (making this point with respect to negotiation generally). 
 168 Mari Byrne, Note, Baseless Pleas: A Mockery of Justice, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2961, 2966 
(2010). 
 169 Gilchrist, supra note 30, at 629 n.110; see also United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 
27–29 (1st Cir. 2005) (explaining that although the law prohibits parties from lying or affirma-
tively misrepresenting evidence, they may agree to proffer certain facts and omit others). 
 170 Johnson, supra note 28, at 858. 
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agreements, encouraging parties to “plea bargain creatively” so they might 
avoid disproportionate punishments.171 Notwithstanding this blessing from 
on high, others describe this issue-bargaining practice pejoratively as “sys-
temic lying” and view it as emblematic of courts abandoning their institu-
tional role in uncovering truth.172 
Examples of this negotiated fictionalizing abound, and many of them 
establish that criminal settlements need not involve the dropping or swap-
ping of an entire charge. Settlements can be more fine-grained and can even 
sidestep a guilty plea. One type of issue-modification (and perhaps also out-
come-modification) agreement common in the 1980s and early 1990s in the 
federal courts was known as “[d]ate bargaining,” whereby the parties would 
agree that an act occurred prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Guide-
lines in order to render them inapplicable.173 Similarly, parties may stipulate 
to possession of a lesser quantity of drugs than the facts actually make plain 
so as to avoid harsh mandatory sentences.174 In fact, a defendant’s criminal 
history—a documented, extant set of facts—is itself often a negotiated story 
in which the parties agree on how to present the defendant’s criminal past to 
the judge.175 According to one supervising probation officer for the Eastern 
District of California after he closely studied sentencing recommendations, 
“Stipulations seem[] to be fictional writings, when compared with the 
known facts of the cases they attempted to address.”176 And a study of pro-
bation officers from 1996 indicates that “approximately forty percent . . . 
believe[d] that guideline calculations set forth in plea agreements in a ma-
jority of cases are not supported by offense facts that accurately and com-
pletely reflect all aspects of the case.”177 
 At the most extreme, agreements to modify a dispute can transform a 
case into a fictional contest entirely unrelated to the original case.178 Con-
                                                                                                                           
 171 Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 373 (2010) (“Counsel . . . may be able to plea bargain 
creatively with the prosecutor in order to craft a conviction and sentence that reduce the likeli-
hood of deportation, as by avoiding a conviction for an offense that automatically triggers the 
removal consequence.”). 
 172 See Julia Simon-Kerr, Systemic Lying, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2175, 2179 (2015). 
 173 Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 262–63 (1989) (emphasis omit-
ted). 
 174 See, e.g., id. at 272–73. 
 175 Caryl A. Ricca, Simplification of Chapter Four: Comments from the Probation Officers 
Advisory Group to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 209, 211 (1997). 
 176 Eugene D. Natali, Commentary, The Probation Officer, Bean Counting and Truth in Sen-
tencing, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 102, 103 (1991). 
 177 See David Yellen, Probation Officers Look at Plea Bargaining, and Do Not Like What 
They See, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 339, 339 (1996). 
 178 See, e.g., People v. Keizer, 790 N.E.2d 1149, 1152 n.2 (N.Y. 2003) (“[A] defendant may 
plead guilty to a crime for which there is no factual basis and even plead guilty to a hypothetical 
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sider the following example of this idea in action: In 2006, a defendant in 
Washington who was accused of participating in a violent robbery pleaded 
guilty to creating no less than one thousand illegal music recordings without 
consent.179 But as the prosecutor made clear in a later newspaper interview: 
“There were no allegations of sound recordings or videos. We were just be-
ing creative to get to the point we needed to get in sentencing.”180 And he 
acknowledged that the robbery charge would have been difficult to prove 
because witnesses had refused to testify.181 As such, by modifying the issues 
in contention, the parties crafted a hypothetical dispute more amenable to 
their joint perspective on how the original case ought to resolve, creating 
new surplus to share. Such fabrications are not altogether uncommon. The 
Supreme Court of California, for instance, has blessed factually baseless 
agreements, stating: “We reiterate our conviction that the plea bargain plays 
a vital role in our system of criminal procedure; we would be loath to reduce 
its usefulness by confining it within the straitjacket of ‘necessarily included 
offenses.’”182 If judges cannot (or refuse to) see the underlying truth, facts 
can be mere speed bumps in parties’ pursuit of their interests. 
 Beyond these types of factually unmoored partial settlements, some 
courts have also tolerated convictions resulting from guilty pleas to nonex-
istent crimes. For example, a New York state court sustained a defendant’s 
guilty plea to the logically inconsistent crime of “attempted manslaughter in 
the second degree” specifically on the basis that the plea “was sought by 
[the] defendant and freely taken as part of a bargain which was struck for 
the defendant’s benefit.”183 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
has also recognized the plea of “attempted recklessness.”184 Thus, with judi-
                                                                                                                           
crime.”); In re Barr, 684 P.2d 712, 715 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (“A plea does not become invalid 
because an accused chooses to plead to a related lesser charge that was not committed in order to 
avoid certain conviction for a greater offense.”); People v. West, 477 P.2d 409, 421 (Cal. 1970) 
(en banc) (allowing a defendant to plead guilty to a similar crime even though it was not a “neces-
sarily included offense”); State v. Harrell, 513 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (allowing a 
guilty plea so long as “a factual basis is shown for . . . a more serious charge”). 
 179 Thomas Clouse, Man Pleads Guilty to Bogus Crime, THE SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (May 1, 
2006), https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2006/may/01/man-pleads-guilty-to-bogus-crime/ 
[https://perma.cc/6QN5-KXT9]. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 West, 477 P.2d at 421. 
 183 People v. Foster, 225 N.E.2d 200, 201–02 (N.Y. 1967); see also People v. Myrieckes, 734 
N.E.2d 188, 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[I]t is not unlawful for the State and a defendant to bargain 
for a plea of guilty to even a nonexistent crime if the defendant receives a benefit.”); McPherson 
v. State, 163 P.3d 1257, 1261–62 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (allowing a plea for “attempted second-
degree unintentional murder”). 
 184 Dale v. Holder, 610 F.3d 294, 302–03 (5th Cir. 2010) (rejecting a Board of Immigration 
Appeals decision that a non-citizen could not plead guilty to “attempted recklessness”). 
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cial consent, parties are able to construct the law itself, making it easier to 
tailor settlements to their respective preferences. Once prosecutors and de-
fendants are released from factual or legal predicates, they can craft entirely 
new criminal disputes that change which statutory requirements apply (if 
they exist at all) and unlock punitive resolutions that were previously una-
vailable. By concocting their own truth, parties can contractually innovate to 
create value they can split. 
 Partial settlements in criminal cases—like all settlements—are driven 
by party preferences and resources, and issue-modification agreements re-
flect the same three motivating interests as procedure-modification agree-
ments: reworking the substantive issues in dispute can cut overall adjudica-
tion costs, reduce risk burdens by cabining uncertainty, and shift the land-
scape of likely outcomes, even opening up previously unavailable sentenc-
ing scenarios. Such agreements can be observed in conjunction with various 
complementary procedural and outcome modifications, but they may also 
occur on their own. Issue modification alone can be a powerful partial-
settlement tool, freeing mutually optimistic parties to realize the value of 
agreement without a more comprehensive settlement. But again, this is only 
so long as the parties can effectively evade the judicial gaze, or the judge 
otherwise agrees to play along with what may be a charade. 
C. Outcome-Modification Agreements 
 An outcome-modification agreement is usually one in which the parties 
agree to restrict or alter the range of potential remedies that a court may im-
pose.185 In the civil context, litigants can agree by contract to transform an 
initial litigation outcome (e.g., a damage award) into an entirely new out-
come after a jury or judge announces a decision (using a function that re-
lates raw verdicts to final awards).186 In the criminal context, however, pros-
ecutors and defendants cannot easily modify final sentencing outcomes, at 
least not in the same way, because the judge’s sentencing determination is 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 85. These agreements often restrict or compress the 
range of final outcomes to reduce uncertainty, which can benefit risk-averse parties. Outcome 
agreements, however, as a general matter simply “translate” an initial outcome (the “default” or 
raw outcome) into a final outcome by which the parties agree to abide. Risk-loving and mutually 
optimistic parties might in theory enter into agreements in which both “bet” they will win, thus 
increasing outcome variation. Consider these terms: “If the judge does not dismiss charge X, the 
defendant agrees to accept the maximum sentence on all remaining charges. If the judge does 
dismiss charge X, the prosecutor agrees to drop all other charges as well.” 
 186 One classic example is a “high-low agreement,” in which a “defendant agrees to pay the 
plaintiff a minimum recovery in return for the plaintiff’s agreement to accept a maximum amount 
regardless of the outcome of the trial.” See High-Low Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019). 
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more or less final.187 Accordingly, criminal outcome modifications often see 
a prosecutor and a defendant agreeing to bind or nudge the judge toward a 
negotiated outcome by recommending a maximum and minimum sentence 
of incarceration. These agreements are often, though again not necessarily, 
accompanied by procedure- and issue-modification agreements as well, ei-
ther as compensating concessions for the sentencing recommendation or 
because the promise of an outcome modification increases, or at least does 
not eliminate, the value of these other exchanges.188 
 Again, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 outlines the most obvi-
ous outcome-modification options available in federal court.189 “Type B” 
agreements involve the prosecutor recommending a particular sentence or 
sentencing range, while “Type C” agreements involve the prosecutor forcing 
a judge to impose (or reject) a specific sentence or one within a specific sen-
tencing range.190 A judge must accept or reject Type C agreements in their 
entirety. If the judge does not agree with the parties’ proposal, the judge is 
not permitted to enter a different sentence, and the defendant may withdraw 
the guilty plea. If the judge rejects the proposal, the prosecutor can abandon 
the charges, the parties can propose an alternative recommendation, or they 
can proceed to trial.191 Type B agreements, on the other hand, do not bind 
the judge to an outcome but act as a nudge. Judges must consider such rec-
ommendations, but they are free to impose any reasonable sentence, within 
certain statutory and constitutional constraints. Defendants may not with-
draw a guilty plea if the imposed sentence departs from the nonbinding rec-
ommendation.192 The defendant received the benefit of the bargain; after all, 
the prosecutor did make the recommendation. 
 The parties who come to agreement must choose whether a binding or 
nonbinding proposal is more or less valuable to them given what might fol-
low. We can expect that if more than one sentence or an entire sentencing 
                                                                                                                           
 187 We can envision agreements that are somewhat close, however. For example, imagine an 
agreement between the parties in which the prosecutor promises not to contest an appeal of the 
sentence (and perhaps is willing to grant other procedural claims) if the judge imposes a sentence 
above a set limit. Such an agreement might reduce the risk associated with judicial discretion at 
the final sentencing stage, and it might even cause the judge to avoid imposing a sentence that the 
court knows the prosecutor would not defend. See discussion infra Part III. 
 188 For instance, a defendant’s agreement to modify the procedure for adjudication on the 
merits (by waiving their right to a jury trial) may be accompanied by an outcome modification in 
which the prosecutor agrees to recommend a lesser sentence. By combining these modifications, 
the value of the entire package increases for both the prosecutor and the defendant, making it 
more likely that parties will reach a mutually beneficial accord. 
 189 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 190 Id. R. 11(c)(1)(A)–(C). 
 191 Id. R. 11(c)(1)(C). 
 192 Id. R. 11(c)(1)(B). 
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range (without a trial) will improve matters for the parties relative to a trial 
with a less predictable outcome or where certain unattractive outcomes are 
relatively more likely with no agreement, they will negotiate over whether 
to select a sentencing recommendation or instead a binding sentence or sen-
tencing range.193 Thus, if a defendant believes that the judge is likely to im-
pose a sentence in line with the prosecutor’s proposal, whatever it is, it 
would not be worthwhile to offer large concessions to the prosecutor to ob-
tain a Type C agreement (more binding) over a Type B agreement (less bind-
ing). Defendants may also value the opportunity to argue for leniency at 
sentencing, particularly if they are confident that their circumstances will 
make them appear more deserving.194 Alternatively, if defendants consider 
the risk of a less predictable sentence to be too high, they may be more in-
clined to pursue the comfortable certainty of a Type C bargain even though 
such a choice may result in a longer expected sentence because, for exam-
ple, they will no longer have an opportunity to convince the judge to choose 
a sentence below the prosecutor’s recommendation. 
 The decision of whether to agree to a binding or nonbinding proposal 
(or to agree at all), then, is a function of the judge’s anticipated reaction to 
any specific sentencing recommendation—and to such agreements general-
ly—as well as the parties’ level and dislike of uncertainty surrounding those 
reactions. Consequently, parties will attempt to anticipate how their judge 
will react to the underlying facts and legal aspects of their case when decid-
ing whether to enter into an outcome-modification agreement at all. Some 
judges, for instance, are adverse toward Type C agreements because they see 
these bargains as usurping judicial authority as well as being disruptive, at 
least in those instances in which the judge must reject the proposal and re-
schedule the hearing.195 Parties can account for these expectations and un-
certainties when shaping settlement terms. Moreover, parties have strong 
incentives to identify and incorporate terms that transmit information sup-
porting the proposal and signal reasonableness to the judge.196 
                                                                                                                           
 193 Sigman, supra note 36, at 1332. 
 194 Cf. George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargain-
ing, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 145, 150–51 (1993) (noting that divergent predictions about the like-
ly outcome of a dispute correlate with a failure to settle). 
 195 See, e.g., United States v. Seidman, 483 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Wis.) (refusing Type C 
agreements because “[i]t is this Court’s prerogative to determine the type of sentence that should 
be imposed upon a defendant for the offense of which he or she has been adjudged guilty”), aff’d, 
636 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1980); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. 
REV. 733, 745 n.55 (1980) (suggesting that judges disfavor Type C agreements because if rejected 
the case goes back onto the trial calendar, disrupting the docket). 
 196 An apt comparison is final-offer arbitration, which is commonly used in Major League 
Baseball. Final-offer arbitration introduces uncertainty into the negotiations in that the arbiter is 
constrained to choose one of the disputant’s final offers as the binding settlement. The parties’ 
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 Whether as part of a Type B or Type C agreement, parties can decide to 
recommend to the judge a specific sentence, a sentencing range, or a sen-
tencing cap.197 The fact that prosecutors and defendants can propose a sen-
tencing range or cap (versus an exact sentence) renders it more likely that 
parties will agree on terms—more wiggle room allows both parties to in-
dulge their divergent beliefs and effectively expands the bargaining zone.198 
Partial settlements of this sort cannot eliminate all uncertainty, and therefore 
risk-averse parties continue to endure risk-bearing costs. But attempting to 
achieve greater certainty by continuing negotiations may be so pricey (in 
both time and money as well as ongoing uncertainty) that both parties may 
prefer to just agree to outsource the determination of the final sentence to 
the judge (constrained, of course, to be within the agreement’s limiting pa-
rameters).199 In fact, there are sure to be many scenarios in which an agree-
ment between the parties is only feasible in terms of a sentencing range.200 
That is, if the parties have access to different information or hold particular-
ly divergent assessments of the defendant’s chance of success during or after 
trial, settlement on an exact sentence may be impossible even as the parties 
are able to reach agreement on a sentencing range. Indeed, optimistic, risk-
neutral parties may even prefer to have the minimum and maximum sen-
tences in the range as far apart as possible.201 Regardless, given party pref-
erences, beliefs, and resources, agreement to a sentencing range or cap may 
be an optimal partial settlement.202 
 Parties can also enter agreements that have the effect of expanding the 
array of potential outcomes to include sentences that were previously una-
                                                                                                                           
competing offers reveal private information to the arbiter and can help drive settlement. See gen-
erally Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, Bargaining with Informative Offers: An Analysis of Final-
Offer Arbitration, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 420 (1998). 
 197 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 198 The situation is highly comparable to outcome modifications in the civil context. For ex-
ample, a high-low agreement (in which the parties pick a maximum and minimum damages 
award) allows defendants to “believe” that they will probably pay the “low” when deciding to 
settle and allows plaintiffs to “believe” that they will probably pay the “high.” Both cannot be 
right, but overoptimism, divergent priors, or asymmetric information is sufficient to persuade both 
parties to accept the arrangement. See Kathryn E. Spier & J.J. Prescott, Contracting on Litigation, 
50 RAND J. ECON. 391, 410 (2019) (discussing these factors in driving contingent settlement 
contracts in the civil context). 
 199 For a discussion on how transaction costs impact settlements, see generally George L. 
Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). 
 200 See J.J. Prescott et al., Trial and Settlement: A Study of High-Low Agreements, 57 J.L. & 
ECON. 699, 728 (2014) (noting this phenomenon in the context of civil high-low agreements). 
 201 See id. at 705 n.19 (noting this in the context of civil high-low agreements). 
 202 Again, consider high-low agreements. There, the plaintiff agrees to a cap on potential 
damages in exchange for a guaranteed minimum return. High-low agreements can be valuable to 
parties too mutually optimistic about their chances at trial to find fully settling attractive. See 
Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 63. 
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vailable—for instance, by agreeing to trigger certain “safety valves.” In the 
federal system, “safety valves” remove a judge’s obligation to impose a sen-
tence that complies with statutory or Sentencing Guidelines’ minimum re-
quirements. There are two main types of safety valves when federal judges 
sentence defendants. The first involves the prosecutor consenting to stipu-
late that the defendant has agreed to cooperate with the government and has 
provided “substantial assistance.”203 The other involves a defendant taking 
responsibility or expressing remorse for their crimes.204 The judge ultimately 
determines whether a defendant has provided sufficient assistance or taken 
sufficient responsibility, but the prosecutor can agree to offer corroborating 
input to improve the defendant’s chance of success. Some judges claim that 
taking responsibility for one’s transgressions provides valuable information 
about the likelihood of the defendant’s rehabilitation and thus future dan-
gerousness.205 For prosecutors and defendants centered on practicalities, 
however, these safety valves function chiefly to loosen and expand the 
boundaries of available outcome options, which the parties then navigate to 
advance their respective interests. 
 The above examples all consist of modifications concerning the poten-
tial length of a defendant’s sentence, but outcome modifications can stretch 
beyond simply the length of incarceration. As part of a settlement, parties 
may construct and agree to outcomes regarding probation, community ser-
vice obligations, facility placement, drug rehabilitation opportunities, resti-
tution, asset forfeiture, and the like.206 A large difference in party valuation 
means more gains from trade, and many of these outcomes matter a great 
deal to some defendants but are often of little value to prosecutors, at least 
those who are not solely interested in maximizing the harm sentences im-
                                                                                                                           
 203 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N 2018). These agreements are common. For example, in 2017, 10.8% of cases involved a 
downward departure due to the defendant providing the government assistance. U.S. SENT’G 
COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, at S-66 fig.G (2017), 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-source
books/2017/2017SB_Full.pdf [https://perma.cc/43JA-7XX7].  
 204 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1. 
 205 See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 753 (1970) (claiming that a defendant’s admis-
sion of guilt demonstrates “hope for success in rehabilitation over a shorter period of time than 
might otherwise be necessary”). 
 206 One interesting set of examples are “release-dismissal” agreements, which usually involve 
a prosecutor agreeing to dismiss criminal charges against a defendant if the defendant agrees to 
release any civil claims they might have against the state. See, e.g., Town of Newton v. Rumery, 
480 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1987). Such agreements are particularly common in cases involving resist-
ing arrest and disorderly conduct scenarios in which the accused claims to have suffered harm; 
they can provide gains on all sides by lowering the exposure experienced by both the defendant 
and the state. See Andrew B. Coan, The Legal Ethics of Release-Dismissal Agreements: Theory 
and Practice, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 371, 387 (2005). 
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pose on defendants. Most prosecutors, we suspect, do not chalk up prevent-
ing a defendant’s incarceration in a facility nearer to the defendant’s family 
as a win.207 Likewise, in some circumstances, offering a defendant the pro-
spect of serving their term of incarceration at a “cushy” minimum security 
prison—derisively referred to as “Club Fed” in the federal prison system—
may be sufficient to seal a deal.208 A defendant may also be willing to spend 
more time incarcerated so long as, say, conjugal visits are permitted.209 De-
spite the risk that a judge may fail to implement these terms (or may not be 
made aware of them), such partial settlements create value by shifting the 
likely outcome and reducing uncertainty surrounding it. 
 Moreover, outcome-modification agreements can go beyond a defend-
ant and directly affect third parties, which occurs only because the defendant 
has an interest in these parties. For instance, hardball prosecutors may 
threaten to investigate and indict a defendant’s friends, family members, or 
co-conspirators unless the defendant relinquishes some or all of their proce-
dural rights.210 Under such circumstances, defendants might feel compelled 
to settle to protect their network from the costs of such attention or to save 
themselves from any reputational effects.211 As another example, consider 
                                                                                                                           
 207 In significant part, this is because these incidental aspects of punishment are unlikely to 
matter to the career concerns of a prosecutor. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 208 Cf. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, From the Boardroom to the Cellblock: The Justifications 
for Harsher Punishment of White-Collar and Corporate Crime, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1295, 1307 
(2005) (describing the deterrent effects of facility placement). 
 209 See Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 TUL. L. REV. 695, 712 & n.100 
(2001) (noting this as an “unauthorized benefit” and citing State v. Horning, 761 P.2d 728, 732–
33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), as “reviewing a plea agreement that included a stipulation by the State 
that it would take no position on the issue of whether the defendant would be allowed to have 
conjugal visits with his wife in the county jail”). 
 210 See, e.g., United States v. Yong, 926 F.3d 582, 591 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing a settle-
ment in which a defendant pleaded guilty as part of a package deal in which his son would not be 
prosecuted if the defendant and all other co-defendants pleaded guilty); United States v. McEl-
haney, 469 F.3d 382, 385–86 (5th Cir. 2006) (permitting a defendant to plead guilty in exchange 
for immunity for him and his family against tax-related prosecution); United States v. Abbott, 241 
F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir. 2001) (allowing a defendant to plead guilty in exchange for the prosecutor 
recommending no prison time for the defendant’s mother). 
 211 See United States v. Lopez, 944 F.2d 33, 36 (1st Cir. 1991) (“A plea agreement entailing 
lenity to a third party ‘imposes a special responsibility on the district court to ascertain [the] 
plea’s voluntariness’ due to its coercive potential.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting United States v. Buckley, 847 F.2d 991, 1000 n.6 (1st Cir. 1988))). In addition, it is im-
portant to note that it may not be possible to enforce these types of agreements. See id. at 37 (ob-
serving without deciding that “even if third party beneficiary principles [from contract law] were 
applicable to a plea agreement in a criminal case, . . . we are unaware of authority to that effect”). 
But see United States v. Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 396–97 (1st Cir. 1978) (rejecting an appeal from an 
incarcerated father who had pleaded guilty on the condition that his son be recommended for 
probation—but who was ultimately sentenced to jail in spite of the recommendation—on the 
grounds that the prosecutor had fulfilled the agreement by in fact recommending probation). 
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that a prosecutor and a defendant can bargain over the type or amount of 
restitution that must be paid to any victims. In this instance, the prosecutor 
may agree to drop certain charges if the defendant agrees to pay for the vic-
tim’s physical or psychological treatment.212 Or the parties may agree that 
the defendant will surrender all profits from a book or movie deal describing 
the offense, on the understanding that these are ill-gotten gains.213 Outcome 
modifications implicating third parties can be powerful negotiation tools to 
encourage defendants and prosecutors to reach agreement. 
 There are also peculiar outcome modifications that involve defendants 
agreeing to take certain actions entirely outside of the criminal justice sys-
tem. During World War II and the Vietnam War (and probably all previous 
armed conflicts of any duration), for instance, defendants would sometimes 
agree to join the military rather than serve jail or prison time.214 And when 
the military put restrictions on its willingness to accept “jailbirds” into ser-
vice, parties crafted (and judges approved) deals meant to circumvent those 
restrictions, such as issue-modification agreements that reframed the specif-
ic charges facing the defendant, so that military service would remain a via-
ble possibility down the road.215  
 Troublingly, defendants may trade even aspects of their bodily integrity 
for prosecutorial benefits. For instance, in 2005 in Fulton County, Georgia, a 
mother suffering post-partum depression allegedly shook her five-week-old 
daughter to death. The prosecutor originally charged the defendant with 
murder, but he later agreed to reduce the charge to manslaughter if the 
mother would agree to plead guilty and undergo a sterilization procedure. 
The prosecutor later stated that he assented to the settlement in part because 
of evidentiary weaknesses in the government’s case.216 Importantly, we do 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See People v. Johns, No. F047499, 2006 WL 798454, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2006) 
(outlining the parameters of such a bargain). 
 213 These restrictions were originally legislative in nature, known as “Son-of-Sam” laws, until 
the Supreme Court ruled them unconstitutional. Nevertheless, parties are free to construct such 
agreements privately. See Colquitt, supra note 211, at 735. 
 214 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 1109, 1154 (2008). Such agreements appear to be less common today, but parties still do 
enter into settlements involving military service. See State v. Hamrick, 595 N.W.2d 492, 493 
(Iowa 1999) (en banc) (discussing a settlement in which the defendant agreed to join the army 
within five months of the state’s dismissal of his charges). 
 215 Hessick, supra note 214, at 1154 n.235 (citing Rod Powers, Can a Judge Order Someone 
to Join the Military or Go to Jail?, BALANCE CAREERS, https://www.thebalancecareers.com/join-
the-military-or-go-to-jail-3354033 [https://perma.cc/G69G-WPQY] (Nov. 25, 2019)). 
 216 Cf. Beth Warren, Mother Chooses Sterilization Over Murder Trial, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Feb. 10, 2005, at A1. For an example involving a similar settlement that was ultimately rejected 
by a court, see Bruno v. State, 837 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (rejecting a settle-
ment involving a defendant charged with lewd and lascivious assault agreeing to undergo surgical 
castration because no statute authorized punitive castration for a conviction on those charges). For 
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not offer these examples of unusual bargains to suggest that they are socially 
valuable or morally acceptable but instead to underscore the notion that par-
ties may at least contemplate exchanging whatever they have available that 
is valuable to the other side if such a trade can improve their position, 
broadly construed.217 
 Aside from the actual outcome-modification agreements that we docu-
ment above, hypothetical agreements are easy to imagine. We can deduce, 
for instance, that prosecutors and defendants may structure agreements in 
ways that directly incorporate the content of a judge’s decision—i.e., con-
tingent arrangements. The parties might agree that if the judge imposes a 
sentence at the high end of a guideline or agreed-upon sentencing range, 
then the prosecutor will make a recommendation (or not oppose a request) 
regarding some of the defendant’s other interests—perhaps regarding charg-
es against friends or family members, treatment by immigration authorities, 
or placement in a nearby facility.218 Or parties might structure settlements 
that “operate” during the sentencing colloquy, hydraulically linking party 
actions to incremental choices made by a judge. To illustrate this idea, and 
assuming that the judge in question addresses one count or sentencing issue 
at a time (or can be convinced to do so), the parties might construct an 
agreement with the logic of a flowchart such that “if the judge finds A and 
sentences to X” then “the prosecutor does B and recommends Y.” The par-
ties could fine-tune their outcome modifications in real time, reacting on the 
fly to judicial decisions as they are handed down, perhaps to dampen varia-
tion and to reduce the likelihood of extreme outcomes.219 Further, a judge 
                                                                                                                           
a discussion of the United States’ horrendous history of sterilization, see generally Vanessa Volz, 
Note, A Matter of Choice: Women with Disabilities, Sterilization, and Reproductive Autonomy in 
the Twenty-First Century, 27 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 203 (2006). 
 217 Parties might even craft punishment options that the law formally prohibits. For instance, 
in 1990, the State of Georgia and a criminal defendant entered into a settlement that involved a 
banishment condition—i.e., that the defendant must leave the state and not return—even though 
exile was an unconstitutional punishment. Phillips v. State, 512 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999). In affirming the settlement, the Court of Appeals of Georgia reasoned that because the 
punishment was a negotiated settlement, the defendant had waived any right to challenge the con-
dition. Id. at 34. Thus, as we note throughout this Article, judges hold the keys to unlocking 
unique outcomes parties may desire to realize their interests. See, e.g., Alhusainy v. Superior 
Court, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 914, 917 (Ct. App. 2006) (refusing to uphold a settlement involving ban-
ishment because the condition was unrelated to criminality or rehabilitation). 
 218 Criminal settlement agreements contingent on third-party actions are not uncommon. Con-
sider for instance agreements in which prosecutors agree to drop charges against a defendant if 
they offer testimony leading to a conviction of a co-conspirator. Parties could easily modify such 
an agreement to take into account not merely the fact of conviction but also the specific sentence 
that the judge imposes. Parties are not necessarily powerless to respond to judicial decisions, and 
they may find it valuable (when possible) to build backstops into their agreements. 
 219 The expense of constructing such a detailed and comprehensive agreement ex ante may 
render it unrealistic in most circumstances. Yet the parties’ interests in cabining judicial discre-
 
2021] Beyond Plea Bargaining 1095 
may encourage or discourage such parsing, depending on their own prefer-
ences. Innovative outcome-modification terms, just like creative procedure- 
and issue-modification terms, may expand the bargaining zone to allow set-
tlements beyond what most view today as feasible. 
* * * 
 Criminal and civil settlement are different. Judicially enforced statutory 
and constitutional limitations pervade criminal adjudication, often leaving 
the parties with noticeably less latitude and control when they bargain. But 
just like civil litigants, prosecutors and defendants can mutually benefit by 
agreeing to modify procedures, issues, and potential outcomes, exchanging 
valuable concessions in line with their preferences. By rebuilding their dis-
pute to minimize costs, mitigate risk, and maximize returns, the parties can 
improve on default arrangements through partial settlement. Yet settlement 
agreements in the criminal domain are implicitly built around judges and 
judicial decision-making—unlike in civil cases, where judicial involvement 
is often optional. Judges always retain some discretion in determining final 
outcomes in a criminal case. This unavoidable kernel of judicial discretion 
necessarily shapes the types of agreements parties are likely to reach. Con-
sequently, it is important to explicitly incorporate into our analysis of crimi-
nal settlement the relationship between, on the one side, the prosecutor and 
the defendant who collaborate on a deal, and on the other, the judge who 
decides the outcome in light of that deal. 
III. MODELING JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL SETTLEMENT 
 The unavoidable discretion of judges and the power of courts as gate-
keepers to state-imposed punishment distinguish settlement in the criminal 
domain from traditional civil settlement. To explore how these distinct fea-
tures affect the dynamics of partial settlement behavior and outcomes, we 
analyze how judges can both respond to and explicitly shape the bargains of 
parties that come before them. Most plea-bargaining scholarship—beyond 
                                                                                                                           
tion may be so strong that simpler arrangements (i.e., ones that take into consideration fewer in-
terim decisions) may nevertheless unlock value. If it is true, as some suggest, that justice is “what 
the judge ate for breakfast,” the parties could alter their outcome recommendations based on 
whether the judge, say, had a Grand Slam versus tea and toast shortly before the colloquy. Such 
an agreement may not be as ridiculous as it sounds. See Shai Danziger et al., Extraneous Factors 
in Judicial Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. AM. 6889, 6889 (2011) (presenting find-
ings—subsequently the subject of considerable criticism from other scholars on data, methodolog-
ical, and interpretation grounds—indicating that the probability of a judge granting a prisoner’s 
parole request is markedly higher at the beginning of the day and just after scheduled food 
breaks). 
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overly stressing guilty-plea agreements to the point of ignoring many other 
potential criminal settlements—has been quick to dismiss the judge’s role, 
emphasizing the centrality of the prosecutor instead.220 Our model brings the 
judge back into frame and places judicial discretion very near the center of 
criminal settlement dynamics. We argue that prosecutors and defendants use 
procedure-, issue-, and outcome-modification agreements to recast their dis-
putes in ways that optimally constrain or influence the exercise of judicial 
discretion to better satisfy their respective preferences. 
 To make our points concrete, we focus on judicial discretion with re-
spect to determining a defendant’s post-conviction sentence, studying how 
settlement agreements can influence this type of outcome by shifting as 
many as five separate constraint points, binding or nudging a judge toward 
the parties’ desired outcome, often in ways that also work to reduce uncer-
tainty and lower adjudication costs. Our conclusions apply just as well to the 
use of judicial discretion at other stages of criminal prosecution, but the pre-
cise structure of federal sentencing renders it a useful platform on which to 
illustrate key mechanisms and moving parts.221 As we show in this Part, the 
various terms parties exchange may operate as complements to or substi-
tutes for one another as defendants and prosecutors seek to reformulate their 
dispute, always with the aim of improving the efficiency, certainty, and con-
sequences of criminal adjudication in jointly optimal ways. 
 Placing judges at the center of our analysis also allows us to highlight 
the potentially active role judges may play in shaping partial criminal set-
tlements. Although judicial review may be minimal with respect to certain 
procedural- or issue-modification terms, it is hard to gainsay the fact that a 
judge could reject virtually any agreement (of which the court is aware) that 
is plausibly at odds with the “interests of justice.”222 Parties have robust in-
centives to erect agreements that they believe will survive review.223 But just 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See, e.g., Standen, supra note 17, at 1477. 
 221 Also, because parties are especially interested in this final exercise of judicial discretion 
(and because it comes very close in time to the conclusion of a criminal adjudication), it is clearly 
salient and surely preoccupies parties in most partial-settlement negotiations. 
 222 This sort of active judicial management is presumably also possible in the civil context 
and may exist in some dark corners, but there can be little doubt that judicial regulation of proce-
dures, issues, and outcomes is more significant in criminal cases on account of the more highly 
regulated environment in which the agreements take shape. 
 223 This is a simplifying assumption, but it is ultimately not critical to our argument, which is 
that parties will consciously design settlement agreements to influence judicial decision-making 
or, when necessary, anticipate and circumvent it. Conceivably, parties may agree to try to influ-
ence a judge by recommending sentences or other adjustments that the judge is sure to reject. One 
could imagine parties trying to leverage some sort of cognitive bias, such as framing, availability, 
or compromise, in how the judge rejects the agreement or makes other decisions in the aftermath 
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as significant, judges can indirectly make terms that courts traditionally do 
not review more or less attractive to parties by allowing, refusing, or adjust-
ing other terms that regularly do receive more searching scrutiny. This un-
derappreciated indirect reach of judicial influence follows from the fact that 
terms from the same or different categories can operate as substitutes or 
complements.224 Consequently, parties are wise to keep in mind the poten-
tially far-reaching consequences of later judicial decisions when negotiating 
over procedural or substantive issues early in litigation. 
 Judicial discretion (even if exercised only during sentencing) implicitly 
affords judges broad power to shape the contours of criminal settlements 
(and thus the entire litigation)—so long as parties have at least some under-
standing ex ante of how judges are likely to respond to the negotiated terms. 
Not surprisingly, judges can and do act strategically to further develop and 
deploy this power by signaling which types of settlements they are more or 
less likely to tolerate—or by otherwise revealing how they will respond to 
certain kinds of proposals. Judges can accomplish this by communicating 
their preferences directly and by signaling through their actions in the case 
and through their reputations established in their work on other cases. By 
how they use power over attempts by prosecutors and defendants to opti-
mize via agreement, judges can make certain types of settlements more or 
less likely. Judges’ gatekeeper status and discretion assure them a central 
role in shaping criminal settlement dynamics and outcomes. 
A. Constraining Judicial Discretion 
 Criminal settlement has at its foundation the idea that defendants and 
prosecutors build agreements collaboratively to bypass or channel judicial 
discretion in ways that align with their preferences. With respect to federal 
sentencing (our case study), we can model that activity by organizing limits 
on judicial discretion as five loci of control: (1) the crime charged, (2) the 
federal Sentencing Guidelines, (3) the applicability of statutory mandatory 
minimums, (4) the terms of parties’ criminal settlements, and (5) an over-
arching reasonableness requirement. By agreeing to procedure, issue, and 
outcome modifications that loosen or tighten these five constraints, parties 
can make it easier or more difficult for the judge to choose a particular sen-
tence. Sources of constraint can be inflexible (binding a judge to a subset of 
                                                                                                                           
of the rejection. Or the rejected proposal might affect later judicial decisions by indirectly reveal-
ing information to the judge about the parties’ preferences or plans. 
 224 Certain viable partial settlements may not be easy to observe (despite our expectations) in 
real-world litigation because substitutes may be more permissible or familiar (or just better) such 
that parties will turn to them out of habit and judges will be more willing to bless them. There is 
usually more than one way to skin a cat. See Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 130. 
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available outcomes) or flexible (nudging a judge by making it more difficult 
or costly to make certain choices). Critically, parties often employ settle-
ment terms in synergistic combinations to create comprehensive settlements 
that better achieve their various interests. 
 Before we detail this line of thinking in more general terms, consider 
first how each of the five loci of constraint affect the scope of judicial dis-
cretion. The charges a prosecutor brings have the greatest influence—they 
restrict what a judge can do by setting inflexible bounds on sentence severi-
ty. Criminal charge bargaining has consumed a great deal of attention pre-
cisely because of the charge’s central role in defining the relevant ambit of 
possible punitive outcomes.225 In criminal law, the criminality of an act and 
its punishment are tightly linked—acts with higher degrees of criminality 
are generally met with more severe sentences. Thus, the charge filed effec-
tively defines the universe of punishments available and shapes the statutory 
maximum and minimum sentences, the range of plausibly relevant Guide-
line factors, and the judge’s determination of what would constitute a rea-
sonable sentence in light of those factors.226 
 Second, sentencing guidelines in general function (or are intended to 
function) to constrain judicial discretion, at least relative to a world without 
guidelines. Even though the federal Sentencing Guidelines today are merely 
“advisory,” they continue to exert influence—on average more than fifty 
percent of federal sentences still fall within the relevant guideline range.227 
The Guidelines require that judges “consult” them prior to issuing any sen-
tence,228 and the figures they contain offer anchoring points for judicial de-
cision-making.229 Moreover, on appeal, sentences falling within the range 
sanctioned by the Guidelines typically garner a presumption of reasonable-
ness.230 To the extent that judges care about a court later overturning a sen-
tence or their need to revisit a case, a sentence that is presumed reasonable 
is more valuable than one that is not. Because of the enduring influence of 
the Guidelines, prosecutors and defendants bargain over inputs to Guideline 
                                                                                                                           
 225 Cf. David Alan Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial Power, 106 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 486 (2016) (describing charge bargaining as “the core prosecutorial 
power in the United States”). 
 226 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). 
 227 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 102, at 11, 86 fig.9 (showing that, on average in 
years 2010–2019, 50.65% of all federal criminal sentences fell within the range recommended by 
the Sentencing Guidelines). 
 228 Booker, 543 U.S. at 264. 
 229 See Mark W. Bennett, Confronting Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” and “Blind Spot” Biases 
in Federal Sentencing: A Modest Solution for Reforming a Fundamental Flaw, 104 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 489, 506 (2014). 
 230 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). 
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calculations. Facts, such as a defendant’s “role in the offense” can heavily 
influence sentencing determinations.231 So, too, can a finding that a defend-
ant “clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.”232 By 
reaching agreement on these factors, parties can make it easier for a judge to 
issue a mutually agreeable sentence. 
 Third, a judge’s tools to overcome mandatory statutory limits are few 
and far between. Unlike the federal Sentencing Guidelines and their adviso-
ry sentencing recommendations, the law requires judges to issue sentences 
within the statutory bounds set by Congress. Issue modifications can shift 
which limits apply, but judges enjoy no authority to issue a sentence falling 
outside of the relevant statutory constraints. There are, however, two ways 
for parties to lever open these constraints. The first allows first-time offend-
ers who meet the criteria set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)—many of which 
are susceptible to negotiation between the parties—to receive a sentence 
below the statutory mandatory minimum.233 The second operates through a 
defendant’s “substantial assistance” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e).234 If an 
agreement between the parties can unlock sentences beyond the applicable 
statutory minimum, the parties can expand their bargaining range and the 
punishment options at the judge’s disposal. Safety valves increase the par-
ties’ uncertainty regarding possible sentences (judges have more potential 
landing points available to them), but the change can be desirable if it also 
improves the parties’ expected outcomes or if it reduces their costs, espe-
cially if they can control the additional risk in some manner. 
 Fourth, any explicit agreement between parties regarding punishment 
also constrains judges. Recall that under federal law, parties’ sentencing 
recommendations can be either binding or nonbinding.235 Binding recom-
mendations, of course, impose a greater constraint on judicial discretion 
than those that are nonbinding. But because judges, like all people, are sub-
ject to anchoring, scaling, and other cognitive biases, any recommendation 
can sway a judge to move in predictable ways.236 Knowing this, the parties 
can craft recommendations that communicate to the judge in a manner likely 
to produce a better outcome. Moreover, judges often have little incentive to 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 110, at 1293 (quoting U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES 
MANUAL §§ 3B.1–.2 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1995)) (noting the “role in the offense” provision of 
the Sentencing Guidelines is often central to parties’ negotiations). 
 232 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. background (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 
2018). 
 233 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). 
 234 Id. § 3553(e). 
 235 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(B)–(C). 
 236 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Can Judges Make Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted 
Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 IND. L.J. 695, 701 (2015). 
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impose a sentence contrary to a recommendation (or to the preferred out-
come implied by a recommendation) because doing so may result in an ap-
peal and potential reversal.237 Complying with parties’ sentencing requests—
i.e., allowing themselves to be nudged toward the parties’ preferences—
permits overburdened judges to dispense with the work of fully justifying 
their decisions. Correspondingly, by offering this carrot, parties can prod a 
judge toward a desired outcome. 
 Finally, laid atop these constraints is the need for any criminal sentence 
to be “reasonable” and for the judge’s exercise of discretion in determining 
a sentence to involve some individualized consideration of the defendant’s 
case, characteristics, and experiences.238 In federal proceedings, judges must 
consider the statutory factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) when devising 
a sentence.239 These sentencing factors are broad and include the circum-
stances of the offense and the defendant’s history, the need for the sentence 
to reflect the motivating purposes of punishment, the available sentences, 
including the Sentencing Guidelines range, and the “need to avoid unwar-
ranted sentencing disparities.”240 A court need not give one factor greater 
weight than another,241 which leaves judges with significant power and flex-
ibility to pursue their own particular ends. Parties, however, can coopt this 
power and influence judicial sentencing outcomes by representing (or mis-
representing) these factors, painting the defendant as more or less culpable. 
As Judge Robert J. Conrad and Katy L. Clements explain, “Instead of airing 
out dirty laundry at trial, defendants . . . [opt] for plea resolution where their 
lawyers have the best opportunity to divert the court’s gaze from the offense 
conduct to arguments for variance.”242  
 Although a judge may impose any reasonable sentence, including one 
inconsistent with the parties’ presentations, departing from the recommenda-
tion creates more work for them (as they must justify their decision in writ-
                                                                                                                           
 237 See Richard S. Higgins & Paul H. Rubin, Judicial Discretion, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 129–
30 (1980) (discussing why potential reversal of a conviction constrains judicial behavior). 
 238 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005). 
 239 Id. 
 240 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 241 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that appellate courts “must give 
due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the 
extent of the variance”). 
 242 Hon. Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From 
Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 135 (2018); see also King, supra 
note 19, at 295 (“[P]arties can minimize the impact of the presentence report by stipulating in 
their plea agreement to facts or to applications of factors, hoping the judge will accept their 
stipulations rather than take the time to adjudicate the accuracy of those facts or issues.”). 
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ing) and also adds risk (by opening the door to reversal on appeal).243 The 
power of any particular recommendation to force a judge’s hand is at its 
zenith when both parties are in agreement, offering them not only the bene-
fit of a unified front on the appropriate sentence under the circumstances but 
also the ability to coordinate (or collude) on the presentation of relevant 
facts and arguments to enhance their persuasive power.244 For this reason, 
settlement terms that specify how the parties will make a joint recommenda-
tion (as well as other factual stipulations) are unsurprising. Where there is 
bargaining surplus to be had, working together at sentencing can increase 
certainty and shift the expected outcome, generating gains for parties to 
share through the exchange of other terms. 
 Figure 1 below illustrates the scope of judicial sentencing discretion in 
a partial criminal settlement framework. The X-axis measures the length of 
sentences that a judge may consider, and the Y-axis indicates the intensity of 
the constraint (i.e., difficulty or cost) a judge faces in imposing the sentence 
in question (given the circumstances of the case, which we hold fixed in this 
illustration).245 As a judge considers whether to issue a sentence that is in-
                                                                                                                           
 243 See United States v. Simpson, 430 F.3d 1177, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (“When a defendant 
has not asserted the import of a particular § 3553(a) factor, nothing in the statute requires the 
court to explain sua sponte why it did not find that factor relevant to its discretionary decision. 
And nothing in Booker added such a requirement.”); id. at 1187 n.10 (“Something more is re-
quired if a district court imposes a sentence outside the Guidelines range. Section 3553(c)(2) pro-
vides that, if a sentence ‘is not of the kind, or is outside the range’ described by the Guidelines, 
the court must state ‘the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that de-
scribed, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and 
commitment.’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3353(c)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2004))); United States v. Mares, 
402 F.3d 511, 519 (5th Cir. 2005) (“When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence 
within the Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little explanation is re-
quired. However, when the judge elects to give a non-Guideline sentence, she should carefully 
articulate the reasons she concludes that the sentence she has selected is appropriate for that de-
fendant.” (footnote omitted)). 
 244 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez-Flores, 444 F.3d 1218, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006) (“When the 
defendant has not raised any substantial contentions concerning non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors 
and the district court imposes a sentence within the Guidelines range, our post-Booker precedents 
do not require the court to explain on the record how the § 3553(a) factors justify the sentence.”). 
 245 The shape of this bowl-like function makes plain that both the law and the parties—
through their recommendations, which leverage law, and any issue- or outcome-modification 
agreements—can constrain judicial discretion. The vertical lines represent sentencing “thresh-
olds” at which a decision becomes easier or more difficult, depending on the direction of the 
change, and they capture the addition of a new source of constraint or the subtraction of a newly 
irrelevant source of constraint. Broken vertical lines indicate that a judge is permitted—even 
though the costs to the judge differ—to impose a punishment on either side of the line, whereas 
solid vertical lines at the statutory limits impose strict mandatory limits on judicial discretion. 
Dashed vertical lines demarcate the parties’ recommendation, which may or may not bind the 
court depending on whether it is a Type C or Type B agreement. The slopes of the function need 
not be same across different regions nor symmetrical on either side of the parties’ joint recom-
mendation. It may also be more difficult for a judge to move the same distance in one direction 
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creasingly further away from a joint party recommendation, they experience 
greater limitations on their prerogative—in terms of an increase in work-
load, greater risk of being overturned on appeal, and any reputational sanc-
tions from colleagues or the Bar for too often frustrating parties’ wishes. 
Some legal constraints on judicial discretion are more robust than others. 
Consequently, a judge can legitimately make the costly decision to impose a 
sentence that does not conform to parties’ Type B nonbinding recommenda-
tion or even one that departs from a Guidelines-recommended sentence, but 
the law does not permit a judge to issue a sentence outside of the statutory 
maximum and minimum set by Congress.246 
 
Figure 1: Constraints on Judicial Discretion 
 
 To be clear, Figure 1 is best thought of as an example of what a particu-
lar judge might face at the sentencing stage after the parties have modified 
the dispute through partial settlement—i.e., anticipating how the judge is 
likely to exercise discretion, the prosecutor and the defendant assemble the 
playing field depicted in Figure 1 to maximize the likelihood of achieving 
their desired outcome, which is itself a function of the costs and risks asso-
ciated with achieving that outcome.247 The parties have already agreed (or 
 
than in another. But the point is that these lines represent sharp shifts in the extent of judicial 
discretion. 
 246 That is, unless there is a “safety valve” or other basis for the judge to depart. See 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(e); U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 247 Figure 1 does not depict “limitations” on judicial discretion that emerge indirectly and 
organically from procedure- or issue-modification agreements that alter a judge’s effective infor-
















2021] Beyond Plea Bargaining 1103 
decided not to agree) on the applicable charge, Guidelines facts, and so on, 
and they must now leave it to the judge to make the final move (in a game 
the parties have tried to rig) by imposing a specific sentence. 
 Implicit in the figure is the landscape over which parties can influence 
the exercise of judicial discretion by shaping the costs and constraints the 
judge must navigate when selecting a sentence. By strategically entering 
into partial-settlement agreements that have the effect of narrowing, broad-
ening, or removing the vertical lines or altering the levels and slopes of the 
constraints, a prosecutor and a defendant can corner or liberate a judge in 
line with their preferences. Also implicit in the figure is the remaining pow-
er of the judge to pursue their own ends through the exercise of discretion. 
Judges will seek to maximize their utility in the face of these constraints.248 
Figure 1 does not mean to imply that parties cannot constrain judges any 
further, nor that parties always seek to maximally bind judges when settling. 
In any particular case, they might, in light of the judge’s signals or reputa-
tion—or lack thereof. But parties may also benefit by speculating on their 
disparate predictions of the judge’s future actions. For instance, if both par-
ties believe that the judge is likely to favor the other party, maximally con-
straining the judge would be attractive to both sides, likely leading to a more 
restricted judicial environment. Or, if the prosecutor and the defendant were 
convinced that the judge would exercise discretion in their favor—i.e., both 
were “mutually optimistic”—the parties might “agree to disagree” and free 
the judge to have a more significant role in sentencing. They would, in all 
likelihood, also exchange other terms that would maximize the judge’s in-
fluence on the outcome later as well, such as agreeing to procedural changes 
that provide the judge with more ammunition or opportunities to shift the 
case in their direction.249 
                                                                                                                           
recorded in a presentencing report, which could in turn make it more difficult for a judge to justi-
fy a particular sentence. Presumably, these partial settlements can also influence a judge’s prefer-
ences over particular sentences, which we might also think of as self-imposed constraints in the 
sense that choosing a sentence that does not “feel” right to a judge is psychologically costly.  
 248 See, e.g., Hon. Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same 
Thing Everybody Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39 (1993) (arguing that judges are ration-
al and maximize their self-interest). 
 249 We see a similar phenomenon resulting from mutual optimism in the civil context. When 
each party is confident it will win, full settlement is less attractive. But this does not mean that 
there are not pockets of value to be uncovered. To be sure, “there are good reasons to think that 
because full settlement is a big step . . . partial settlements have a unique potential to offer both 
parties significant net benefits even when full settlement does not.” Prescott & Spier, supra note 
4, at 78 (footnote omitted). So too in the criminal context. By entering into agreements that lever-
age judicial discretion, prosecutors and defendants can craft partial settlements that make the most 
of their optimistic positions, at least ex ante. 
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 Accordingly, when parties weigh the value of a particular criminal set-
tlement against another agreement or against a “naked” trial, they incorpo-
rate expectations about judicial behavior—designing their partial settlement 
both with a clear-eyed recognition of a judge’s power and with the auda-
cious aim of working together to control the scope of this power. Especially 
risk-averse parties may enter partial settlements that include multiple terms 
that have the collective effect of reducing the level of uncertainty dramati-
cally, or they may take advantage of options that explicitly reduce risk, like 
agreeing to a specific sentence.250 The choice will depend on party prefer-
ences, any collateral effects on other relevant considerations (e.g., litigation 
costs), and the likely reaction of the judge. Alternatively, a risk-seeking or 
very optimistic party may enter agreements, or refuse to enter agreements, 
in ways that expand judicial discretion in the hope of besting the alternative. 
The point is that, by partially settling, parties can push a judge toward their 
preferred outcome even in the face of significant judicial autonomy. Criti-
cally, however, judges can push back. 
B. Judicial Shaping of Criminal Settlement 
 At first blush, one might treat a judge’s sentencing discretion as a non-
strategic source of uncertainty for parties negotiating a partial settlement.251 
Just as civil litigants could, in theory, write a settlement contract in which 
damages turned on whether the Dow Jones went up or down in two weeks, 
one might think parties to a criminal dispute would be free to craft their par-
tial settlements to incorporate judicial discretion and a judge’s preferences 
with no fear of the judge reacting in a counterproductive way (from the par-
ties’ perspective) to the existence or terms of any settlement.252 But judges 
need not be, and most likely are not, passive audiences to parties’ agree-
ments. Judges may have goals of their own in presiding over a dispute, and 
their ability to achieve those goals may depend on the settlement behavior 
                                                                                                                           
 250 Consider a Type C agreement with a specific sentence rather than a sentencing range. 
Hypothetically, the parties risk only that the judge will reject their plea. But see discussion infra 
Part III.B (examining how judges can exert influence to constrain parties from entering agree-
ments that would fully bind their discretion). 
 251 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1059, 1081 (1976) (quoting one public defender as describing judicial discretion over 
sentencing as “a plunge from an unknown height”). 
 252 See James D. Miller, Using Lotteries to Expand the Range of Litigation Settlements, 26 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 69, 89 (1997) (discussing the benefits of using randomness to resolve outstanding 
issues and uncertainty, and noting that “[p]rosecutors could use lotteries and other devices in plea 
bargaining negotiations to achieve more efficient sentencing”). 
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of the parties.253 Although prosecutors and defense attorneys are very often 
repeat players, privileged to know judges individually and in general and to 
understand their decision-making, judges can deploy uncertainty strategical-
ly, and can do so case by case, to enhance or undermine parties’ negotiations 
and otherwise encourage or discourage certain types of settlements. In the 
lyrical words of Albert W. Alschuler, “[I]n the minuet of plea negotiation, 
truly delicate movements by a trial judge may have a meaning of their 
own.”254 In the discussion that follows, we consider how judges may exert 
counter-pressure on prosecutors and defendants in order to avoid or resist 
any unwanted attempt to cabin the court’s discretion. 
One reason judicial power in criminal settlements is often overlooked 
is because, at least at the federal level, judges are prohibited from directly 
participating in party settlement discussions.255 This prohibition blossomed 
in 1974 out of a concern that judicial involvement might increase a defend-
ant’s feelings of coercion, and as a result, could have the effect of undermin-
ing a judge’s image as a neutral arbiter.256 The rule has been strictly enforced 
such that it treats even slight intrusions as violations, and prosecutors and 
defendants cannot even jointly consent to judicial participation in their set-
tlement negotiations.257 Formally speaking, at least, federal judges can play 
no direct role in facilitating or discouraging party negotiations regarding 
settlement, and their oversight role as presiding court officials is limited to 
                                                                                                                           
 253 Judges, like other rational actors, are motivated by a variety of interests that they wish to 
advance, including success in their careers, the respect of their colleagues, ideological commit-
ments, or simply leisure. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 248, at 39. 
 254 See Alschuler, supra note 251, at 1094; see also Shay Lavie & Avraham Tabbach, Litiga-
tion Signals, 58 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 55 (2018) (discussing strategic signaling under condi-
tions of asymmetric information). 
 255 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). States vary in the amount of judicial involvement permit-
ted, but a recent study suggests that regulated judicial involvement results in more informed sen-
tencing and certainty among parties. See Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revo-
lution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 
TEX. L. REV. 325, 329 (2016). 
 256 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1974 amendment; see also United States 
ex rel. Elksnis v. Gilligan, 256 F. Supp. 244, 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (noting the coercive effects of 
judicial participation in plea bargaining). 
 257 See McConkie, supra note 29, at 65 (collecting and reviewing cases on plea bargaining). 
Notably, the prohibition applies most clearly to bargains involving guilty pleas. As we conceive 
of criminal settlement, it can include agreements that alter the nature of the dispute in many ways, 
including procedure modifications and the like. Of course, we doubt that Rule 11 could be inter-
preted to apply to a judge trying to facilitate or discourage an agreement between parties over a 
minor procedural adjustment. Even so, a hands-off mentality induced by Rule 11 may discourage 
active involvement in other areas. 
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the review of any agreements—specifically, plea deals—that parties strike 
and decide to present to them.258  
But this formal prohibition does not halt considerable informal judicial 
influence on parties and their conversations. How could it? At a minimum, 
parties will always attempt to anticipate a judge’s future decisions, and those 
expectations may have significant effects on the strategic choices of par-
ties.259 By uttering offhand remarks during pretrial proceedings as well as 
through their previous decisions in this or other cases, a judge can basically 
shout or whisper the degree to which they are willing to go along with a 
given settlement term.260 Prosecutors and defenders are often well aware of 
a given judge’s proclivities.261 And the parties may be able to estimate with 
some confidence how a particular judge will react to particular settlement 
practices, diminishing their uncertainty and, often, shifting the relative value 
of particular terms.262 
 Not surprisingly, judges can disrupt these expectations whenever doing 
so advances their own goals. They can behave strategically to enhance or 
                                                                                                                           
 258 In those states without a Rule 11 analog prohibiting judicial involvement, judges’ ability 
to inject themselves strategically into negotiations is more apparent. Yet even where permitted, 
some judges tend to be more active and others more passive in their involvement. See King & 
Wright, supra note 255, at 388–92 (citing interviewees reporting that older judges, those in rural 
districts, and those facing reelection were more likely to participate in plea negotiations than their 
younger, urban, and safe counterparts). 
 259 See Anna Offit, Prosecuting in the Shadow of the Jury, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1071, 1114 
(2019) (“[Prosecutors] prepar[e] cases in the shadow of idiosyncratic federal judges . . . whose 
views may be well-known . . . .”). 
 260 For instance, “a judge might intimate that a favorable sentence would follow a guilty plea 
by suggesting that they can resolve the case quickly or by discussing the equities of the case in a 
sympathetic manner.” Alschuler, supra note 251, at 1092–94 (footnote omitted) (describing how 
judges influence plea bargains through “[h]ints, [i]ndirection and [c]ajolery” (emphasis omitted)). 
Furthermore, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) requires that “[b]efore the court may 
depart from the applicable sentencing range on a ground not identified for departure either in the 
presentence report or in a party’s prehearing submission, the court must give the parties reasona-
ble notice that it is contemplating such a departure.” FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(h). This provides yet 
another opportunity for a judge to strategically signal to the parties their assessment of the case. 
 261 Even before the Guidelines era, when sentences were “random, ill-reasoned, or disparate,” 
sentencing was done with “sufficient predictability and uniformity to permit widespread plea 
settlements.” Standen, supra note 17, at 1503; see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, Uncertain Bargains: 
The Rise of Plea Bargaining in America, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1721, 1741 (2005) (reviewing 
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA 
(2003)) (“Defense attorneys and prosecutors, repeat players all, will probably be able to make 
reasonably informed guesses about expected sentences. Thus, the additional discretion provided 
under Booker’s approach to sentencing may affect the ‘price’ of the plea bargain, but it is not 
likely to prevent the parties from agreeing on a deal.”). 
 262 See Offit, supra note 259, at 1114 (drawing on ethnographic research to show that judicial 
proclivities influence bargaining between prosecutors and defendants); cf. Norman Lefstein, Plea 
Bargaining and the Trial Judge, the New ABA Standards, and the Need to Control Judicial Dis-
cretion, 59 N.C. L. REV. 477, 490 (1981) (noting this effect). 
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limit the degree of randomness or unpredictability that parties perceive, 
which can impact both the likelihood of settlement and the types of terms 
any settlement between the parties is likely to contain. By upping uncertain-
ty through mixed signaling or inconsistent rulings—in all cases or just in the 
instant one—judges can alter settlement dynamics, perhaps reducing the 
likelihood of settlement by playing on the parties’ loss aversion or optimism 
when they have divergent priors about the probable outcome of any decision 
(i.e., each party interprets greater uncertainty as increasing their chances of 
success) or instead stimulating the parties’ desire to settle by triggering risk 
aversion.263 Alternatively, judges who behave predictably—by consistently 
sentencing within the Sentencing Guidelines’ recommended range, for in-
stance—encourage parties to settle by reducing the expected payoff of a sen-
tencing hearing, by making delay and further investment of resources unat-
tractive, or by nudging parties toward settlement terms that are relatively 
more valuable in a world with less uncertainty. 
 To understand how a judge’s decision to increase or reduce uncertainty 
can affect the settlement behavior of parties, consider once more the five 
loci of control we outline above. Begin again with the settlement on a par-
ticular charge. Although parties generally enjoy considerable discretion in 
dismissing and amending charges, the prospect of judicial review matters to 
these decisions.264 A judge can scrutinize a prosecutor’s charging decisions 
and consider at sentencing those facts “found by a jury or admitted by the 
defendant, . . . conduct that was not charged, as well as . . . conduct underly-
ing charges of which the defendant was acquitted.”265 Moreover, in cases 
involving multiple criminal charges, the parties know that the judge will 
eventually determine whether sentences will be served concurrently or con-
secutively, which can dramatically affect the amount of time a defendant 
spends incarcerated.266 Accordingly, a judge’s proclivities impact the value 
of certain settlement types. To illustrate, a defendant will attribute less value 
to an issue-modification term in which the prosecutor agrees to drop charges 
if the judge is known to uniformly issue concurrent sentences. Likewise, 
judges who have reputations for scrutinizing uncharged conduct will likely 
be met with settlements containing highly edited fact patterns or with what 
                                                                                                                           
 263 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 5, at 2533 (“Indeterminacy leaves more room for each side to 
be overly optimistic, to take risks, to anchor on irrelevant benchmarks, or to otherwise misesti-
mate the likely sentence.”). 
 264 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 265 MICHAEL A. FOSTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV. LEGAL SIDEBAR, LSB10191, JUDICIAL FACT-
FINDING AND CRIMINAL SENTENCING: CURRENT PRACTICE AND POTENTIAL CHANGE 1 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10191.pdf [https://perma.cc/2USP-K29Z]. 
 266 See Crespo, supra note 63, at 1335. 
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appear to be fact patterns involving significantly less uncharged criminal 
conduct than we may otherwise expect to see.267 
 Consider next the role of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the changes in 
judicial behavior that appear to have followed the transition from mandatory 
to permissive guidance. Research shows that, after the Supreme Court de-
cided United States v. Booker in 2005, judges follow the recommendations 
of the Sentencing Guidelines less than half of the time.268 Furthermore, the 
extent to which judges follow these Guidelines differs by type of crime.269 
Moreover, some judges appear to be more amenable to guidance than others. 
Surveys suggest that opposition to the Guidelines is higher among federal 
judges with pre-Guidelines sentencing experience and lower among those 
without that experience.270 Thus, the level to which the Guidelines will mat-
ter in negotiations will turn on whether the prosecutor and the defendant 
believe their judge will find them controlling under the circumstances. A 
judge who always issues Guideline-compliant sentences sends a signal to 
parties about how best to construct their settlements. Parties will build their 
settlement agreements on those expectations—unless and until such a judge 
decides to chart a new path. 
 A judge’s view of the Sentencing Guidelines can also shape their posi-
tion on the trial/settlement differential, or the “trial penalty.” This affects the 
value of certain settlement terms—particularly procedure modifications, like 
jury waiver, but also issue modifications that are isomorphic in their effects. 
The Sentencing Guidelines instruct judges to take into account the defend-
ant’s “acceptance of responsibility” in sentencing,271 and data reveal that 
judges grant the responsibility-taking reduction in over ninety-five percent 
of federal convictions.272 Data are not available on how often a judge grants 
the reduction when a defendant does not plead guilty outright, but the 
                                                                                                                           
 267 For an example, in 1979, the Supreme Court of California determined in People v. Harvey 
that dismissed charges could not be considered at sentencing as “[f]actors relating to the crime.” 
602 P.2d 396, 398 (Cal. 1979) (quoting CAL. R. CT. 4.421(a) (1977) (amended 2018)). Parties 
responded by entering “Harvey waivers” that effectively undid the court’s decision and allowed 
judges to consider uncharged conduct for specific purposes, most often for restitution. See CAL. 
PENAL CODE § 1192.3(b) (West 2020). Under these arrangements, the defendant gets the benefit 
of the dropped charge without the state losing all of the benefits of bringing the charge by subse-
quently agreeing to dismiss it. 
 268 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 102, at 78 tbl.24. 
 269 In 2019, for instance, 25.4% of cases involving tax offenses carried Guideline-compliant 
sentences. Id. at 90 tbl.31. That figure is only 18.5% for bribery/corruption offenses, and it is a 
mere 10% for antitrust offenses. Id. Compare those figures to the 90.8% of Guideline-compliant 
sentences for drug possession offenses. Id. 
 270 See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: 
Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 716 n.10 (2008). 
 271 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). 
 272 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 102, at 72–73 tbl.21. 
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Guidelines instruct that a reduction in such a scenario should only be grant-
ed in “rare situations.”273 Yet the same Guidelines also instruct that “[t]he 
sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance 
of responsibility” and that a judicial determination is thus “entitled to great 
deference on review.”274 Some courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit, have held that a defendant who exercises their right to 
trial is not per se barred from the responsibility-taking discount.275 Judges 
can dramatically upset the apple cart by granting sentencing discounts to 
defendants who accept responsibility only after enjoying an unadulterated 
trial. In the end, judges are free to change the “price” of jury trials as parties 
negotiate criminal settlements. 
 Judges can also influence criminal settlements by how they react to 
mandatory statutory sentencing scenarios. Again, judges may signal to par-
ties by always (or usually) implementing the maximum sentence in certain 
types of cases or, alternatively, always concluding that the minimum is ap-
propriate.276 Even in those instances in which prosecutors petition judges to 
deviate from statutory constraints—by stating that the defendant offered the 
government substantial assistance, for instance—uncertainty remains. This 
is because 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) requires judges to determine whether the 
assistance is in fact substantial enough to warrant a departure.277 And there 
is much debate among jurists over what should be considered an “appropri-
ate reduction.”278 A judge who endeavors to scrutinize closely the govern-
ment’s recommendation or who finds few instances in which a reduction is 
appropriate will undercut the value of safety valves in negotiation. In re-
sponse, parties will re-optimize in the face of this anticipated judicial behav-
ior—they are free to respond by focusing on other terms and by looking for 
                                                                                                                           
 273 The only example provided is “where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve is-
sues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make a constitutional challenge to a statute or a 
challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct).” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 3E1.1 cmt. 2. 
 274 Id. § 3E1.1 cmt. 5. 
 275 See, e.g., United States v. Dhingra, 371 F.3d 557, 568 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[A] defendant who 
exercises his constitutional right to a trial does not automatically forfeit the benefit of the adjust-
ment for acceptance of responsibility.”). 
 276 Some judges are known as being particular about certain types of crime. Judge James S. 
Gwin of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, for instance, rails against man-
datory punishments for child pornography possession and recently conducted in one trial a jury 
poll on sentencing in order to show “how off the mark the Federal Sentencing Guidelines are.” 
United States v. Collins, 828 F.3d 386, 388 (6th Cir. 2016). The mean juror recommendation was 
14.5 months, while the statutory range was 262 to 237 months. Id. Judge Gwin sentenced the 
defendant to the statutory minimum. Id. 
 277 See Hon. Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assis-
tance Departures in Combating Ultra-uniformity, 35 B.C. L. REV. 799, 818–19, 832–33 (1994). 
 278 See id. at 825–26. 
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the most effective substitutes. Still, judicial discretion can limit the value of 
specific types of bargains that the judge finds unappetizing, producing a dif-
ferent set of criminal settlements than we may otherwise expect. 
 It is also relatively easy for judges to influence whether the sentencing 
recommendations parties present to them are binding or nonbinding. The 
value of one over the other turns significantly on how the parties suspect the 
judge will behave in light of their proposal. Some judges are known to loath 
binding agreements.279 Other judges may be more willing to accept any type 
of negotiated agreement so long as the proposal offers a sufficiently wide 
range for them to exert meaningful discretion.280 Imagine the frustration of a 
judge presented with, say, only a three-month difference between the high 
and the low sentences in a proposal. Alternatively, some judges may make 
plain that they welcome narrow binding agreements, either to reduce their 
workload or, more interestingly, perhaps as an invitation to engage in more 
meaningful back-and-forth communication. In theory, a precise recommen-
dation would allow a judge to review the parties’ proposal and reject it, so as 
to signal what the court is willing to accept without running afoul of prohi-
bitions on judicial participation in negotiations.281 A judge’s reputation will 
shape the parameters of the parties’ proposal. 
 Finally, judges likely have the most power to influence the dynamics 
and terms of criminal settlements when assessing whether a recommenda-
tion satisfies the mandatory reasonability requirement.282 Judges have con-
siderable discretion and appear to regularly consider—either consciously or 
unconsciously—legally irrelevant factors in fashioning sentences. For ex-
ample, some data show that Black and white judges alike sentence Black 
defendants more harshly when compared to white defendants.283 Likewise, 
some evidence suggests that female judges sentence defendants to longer 
                                                                                                                           
 279 See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 280 Cf. supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 281 See Sigman, supra note 36, at 1340. 
 282 See, e.g., United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 456–57 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he overarch-
ing standard of review for unreasonableness will not depend on whether we agree with the partic-
ular sentence selected but whether the sentence was selected pursuant to a reasoned process in 
accordance with law, in which the court did not give excessive weight to any relevant factor, and 
which effected a fair and just result in light of the relevant facts and law.” (citation omitted)); see 
also United States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1004 (8th Cir. 2005) (likening appellate review for 
reasonableness to the review for abuse of discretion). 
 283 See, e.g., THOMAS M. UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE: BLACK JUDGES AND DEFENDANTS IN 
AN URBAN TRIAL COURT 78 (1979) (arguing that Black defendants are sentenced to longer sen-
tences than white defendants by both Black and white judges). 
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terms and are less likely to incarcerate women.284 Judges appointed by 
Democrats appear to impose shorter sentences than Republican-appointed 
judges for crimes involving violence, theft, and drugs.285 
 And so on. The main takeaway is that judges have broad sentencing 
discretion and appear to use their discretion in ways that are individually 
distinctive—systematically so. When this happens, or when a judge signals 
that it will happen going forward, we should expect parties to negotiate set-
tlement agreements in light of that information. Obviously, defendants can-
not alter their demographic characteristics or pick specific judges likely to 
be lenient toward someone in the defendant’s group, but parties can take 
information about judicial tendencies and biases into account in fashioning 
their settlements. They can use this information to constrain or leverage a 
judge’s decision-making in accord with their preferences. A binding, narrow 
recommendation, say, may be more valuable to a defendant who anticipates 
a biased or otherwise inequitable sentence. 
 
Figure 2: Judicial Preferences and Constraints on Discretion 
 
 In Figure 2, we illustrate our basic claim about the role of judicial dis-
cretion in the dynamics of criminal settlement. We add a second function—a 
concave parabola—over the top of Figure 1 in order to demonstrate how a 
judge’s willingness to impose a particular sentence interacts with the various 
 
 284 See Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Herbert, Women and Men Policymakers: Does the 
Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES 1163, 1174, 
1777 (1998). 


















1112 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1047 
constraints the parties place on the judge’s decision-making freedom.286 The 
difference between the two figures is now that the Y-axis also measures the 
judge’s baseline preference to impose any given sentence (i.e., not taking 
into account the constraints imposed by the law and party settlement). In 
this particular example, we draw the parabola in a way that indicates that the 
judge’s and the parties’ preferences over various sentences are roughly 
aligned—i.e., the judge happens to prefer to impose the sentence recom-
mended by the parties. But imagine the parabola shifting to the right or the 
left or becoming more concave (a higher peak with narrower base). If the 
curve shifts far to the left, we could find ourselves in a situation in which 
the judge is entirely unwilling to impose the statutory maximum—or even 
the Guideline minimum. In that scenario, there would be little for the parties 
to gain by dickering over terms that solely affect those values. 
Just as parties manipulate the stringency of constraints on judges 
through how they recast their dispute, judges can behave in ways that signal 
how they will exercise discretion in the future and thereby change the set-
tlements we are likely to encounter. These revelations may be truthful or 
strategic. Either way, judges have the power to affect the relative usefulness 
of various constraints and, thus, the “prices” for concessions in settlement 
negotiations.287 Imagine these two functions sliding atop one another, as 
both the judge and the parties manipulate the contours according to the 
choices and signaling of the other player. This push-pull relationship sets the 
values of partial-settlement terms and agreements as a whole. Modifica-
tions—whether procedural, issue-oriented, or outcome-related—are largely 
fungible, at least when prosecutors and defendants care only about the final 
sentence.288 Thus, as one potential manipulation of the scope of judicial dis-
cretion becomes less valuable in light of judicial preferences or signaling, 
optimizing prosecutors and defendants will shift their focus toward terms 
                                                                                                                           
 286 As in Figure 1, the X-axis represents the length of the sentence. Solid, dashed, and dotted 
vertical lines continue to represent constraint points on judicial discretion that are either flexible 
or inflexible. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 287 See supra note 269 and accompanying text; see also Ilya Beylin, Comment, Booker’s 
Unnoticed Victim: The Importance of Providing Notice Prior to Sua Sponte Non-Guidelines Sen-
tences, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 961, 964 (2007) (“When a judge rejects a plea bargain and imposes, 
sua sponte, a non-Guidelines sentence without providing parties an opportunity to dispute her 
reasoning [under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h)], she places the bargaining parties in a 
precarious position: they must craft stipulated facts in a manner that provides no conceivable 
basis for overturning their bargain or risk the imposition of a sentence substantially different from 
that on which the parties agreed.”). 
 288 We can imagine defendants who, in addition to a lesser sentence, also value exercising 
their due process rights. Notions of procedural justice can be a strong and rational motivator. Cf. 
Prescott & Spier, supra note 4, at 79 (“Opposing litigants may agree to settlements for entirely 
different reasons.”). 
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“in the money.” Judicial decision-making influences the settlement terms we 
should expect to observe in practice, and judges can use this power strategi-
cally if they are so inclined. 
* * * 
 Our analysis has shortcomings. First, although we claim throughout 
that the universe of potential criminal settlement agreements is large and 
diverse, we are unable to comprehensively categorize this universe. We also 
do not explicitly treat the role judges have in policing procedure modifica-
tions and the like during proceedings themselves. Second, judges are not 
necessarily privy to all settlement-related information, and this information 
asymmetry affects the analysis. Judges may not be aware, for instance, of 
agreements over collateral effects or agreements not to prosecute a defend-
ant’s co-conspirators. These types of agreements, more so than others, occur 
offstage and beyond the reach of the judge—or the judge is at least likely to 
be in the dark about these terms. While the judge has no authority to compel 
a prosecutor to bring charges against a co-conspirator or recommend remov-
al proceedings, this is not dispositive. Judicial power is fungible in the sense 
that although a judge may not have the right to formally review certain deci-
sions, a judge does have indirect, informal power to sway them. As lawyers 
are well aware, it is often a bad idea to anger a judge even when you have 
the absolute right to do so.289 
Our analysis may also suggest that parties bargain over each settlement 
term individually as they try to constrain or leverage judicial discretion and 
maximize their position. This often may not be the case. Instead, many 
crimes have a going price for “off the shelf” pleas and other concessions—
options with more of a take-it-or-leave-it feel.290 Establishing standard pric-
es and useful settlement terms for regularly occurring scenarios allows pros-
ecutors and defenders to bargain efficiently without unrealistically burden-
some transaction costs. The analysis we offer above can be reframed to rep-
resent these going rates and the logic of our arguments remains true, but it 
would be an error to suggest that parties always engage in careful considera-
tion of all terms or means of guiding judicial discretion. A corollary is that, 
in many instances, the cost of negotiating a settlement or a particular term is 
too high, and so the parties stick with default rules. Complex criminal set-
                                                                                                                           
 289 See Terry A. Maroney, Angry Judges, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1209 (2012). 
 290 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS 
U. PUB. L. REV. 79, 82 (2011) (analogizing the plea bargain market to car dealerships where most 
consumers get the going rate (negotiated outcomes) and “only a few suckers pay the full sticker 
price” (non-negotiated outcomes)). 
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tlements likely make the most sense in high-stakes criminal disputes in 
which the parties have a lot of resources or a lot to lose. 
 Another limitation of our settlement analysis is that it may give the er-
roneous impression that judges and parties inevitably stand on equal footing 
in affirmatively shaping settlement agreements. Often, they do not. Parties 
will tend to care much more about using agreements to generate surplus to 
share in the dispute than the judge, whose preferences may mean there is 
often little to gain from strategically influencing criminal settlement terms. 
Moreover, parties can be adept at hiding inconvenient facts from a judge, 
and judges are likely to be at a considerable disadvantage in terms of access 
to relevant settlement information.291 Because judges are so often overbur-
dened with cases, they also have a strong incentive to honor party agree-
ments and hurry the disposition of cases.292 Even if a judge plays their role 
strategically, our model suggests that nimble parties with time and resources 
and a lot on the line will maneuver in response so as to re-optimize. Judges 
in theory may have power but in practice may be outnumbered. Still, our 
model helps to demonstrate how partial-settlement agreements in the crimi-
nal context operate to help parties capitalize on their shared interests despite 
the inability to fully “settle” their dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
 Basic economics and psychology tell us that prosecutors and defend-
ants are likely to enter into agreements with each other when they are mutu-
ally beneficial. Our analysis shows that they can and do benefit by partially 
settling criminal cases. The process and prevalence of criminal settlement, 
however, implicates moral and political considerations, that, although be-
yond the reach of this Article, we should not leave completely unaddressed. 
The scholarship and popular discourse are replete with criticism of, and res-
ignation to, plea bargaining as the central component of our criminal justice 
system.293 It is normatively wrong, some say, to allow the state to buy a de-
fendant’s constitutional rights by offering coercive discounts. This wrong is 
particularly pronounced given the race and gender disparities that permeate 
                                                                                                                           
 291 See supra notes 109–111 and accompanying text. 
 292 See supra notes 105–108 and accompanying text. 
 293 Albert Alschuler, for instance, fiercely criticizes criminal settlement because it “place[s] a 
price in dollars . . . on things that we should be reluctant to sell: human liberty, the legitimate 
objectives of the criminal sanction, and the right to a hearing.” Alschuler, supra note 3, at 678–
79. But, as Judge Frank H. Easterbrook retorts, regulation is likely to drive bargains to the black 
market, and judges “serve best by preventing fraud and ensuring that bargains reflect voluntary 
decisions.” Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining Is a Shadow Market, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 
551, 551 (2013). 
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the plea-bargaining process.294 Yet the desire among actors to improve their 
lot is strong, and parties to a dispute will seek to do so even within draconi-
an constraints. So while we can model the motivations of the prosecutor and 
the defendant in “buying” and “selling” to hopefully profit before a judge, 
there remains much tension over how and the degree to which we as a socie-
ty believe this marketplace should be regulated. 
 The partial or incomplete settlement framework we advance here does 
not resolve this tension, though it may offer a fresh lens through which to 
view it. By recognizing that prosecutors and defendants bargain to maximize 
their interests along multiple dimensions—and that they will always bar-
gain, no matter where the starting points, as long as each party possesses 
something the other party values more—decision-makers may choose to 
regulate in ways that alter the relative costs and risks associated with specif-
ic types of agreements. For instance, if our concern with criminal settlement 
is the ease with which the state can convince a defendant to proceed directly 
to sentencing, restricting bargaining per se is unnecessary when we can in-
stead change party endowments. Altering each party’s initial stake could 
limit the extent to which the guilty plea is the premier concession most de-
fendants have to offer. Or, if we worry over prosecutors’ outsized power to 
shape sentences, we could authorize judges to more forcefully inject them-
selves into negotiations to regulate the amount of risk the parties face in the 
bargains they consider. By deliberately releveling the playing field through 
changing the values of various settlement terms, policy-makers can channel 
parties toward more socially palatable criminal settlements. 
 Accordingly, shifting focus away from “plea bargaining” and toward 
“criminal settlement” is not an exercise in semantics. It is a comprehensive 
shift in thinking about prosecutors, defendants, and judges, and their varied 
(and at times opposing) interests and resources. Further, it allows us to see 
the underlying connections between what motivates all settlement behavior 
across contexts—civil and criminal—which is, to mitigate risks, minimize 
costs, and maximize ex ante returns. Because parties to criminal litigation 
cannot completely settle their disputes, their agreements are shaped in light 
of formal and informal constraints. Prosecutors and defendants modify pro-
cedures, issues, and outcomes in order to arrive at bargains most congruent 
with their preferences and in line with the anticipated judicial response. By 
giving definition to these partial settlements and demonstrating how they 
help parties realize their interests, our analysis underscores how conceptual-
                                                                                                                           
 294 See generally Carlos Berdejó, Criminalizing Race: Racial Disparities in Plea-Bargaining, 
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187 (2018); Carlos Berdejó, Gender Disparities in Plea Bargaining, 94 IND. 
L.J. 1247 (2019). 
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ly limiting the idea of “plea bargaining” can be, and we hope it paves the 
way for a more complete and cohesive understanding of how our system 
resolves the vast majority of criminal disputes. 
